editorial| August 12 2020 Annual Editor Report Mary E. Barth Mary E. Barth Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar The Accounting Review (2019) 94 (6): 1a–21. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10749 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Mary E. Barth; Annual Editor Report. The Accounting Review 1 November 2019; 94 (6): 1a–21. doi: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10749 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest Search This content is only available as a PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Despite the intuitive appeal, prior research finds mixed evidence on whether higher audit fees translate to superior audit quality. Under the assumption that product differentiation between auditors is based, in large part, on the level of financial statement assurance, we propose more refined measures of excess audit fees that separate auditor premiums from other fee premiums. Consistent with our conjecture, we identify significant variation in audit pricing across auditors (i.e., auditor premiums) that relates positively to audit quality. Conversely, we find no evidence that higher engagement‐specific fee premiums (i.e., fee model residuals) are positively related to proxies for audit quality. Additional tests indicate that our results do not simply reflect premiums attributable to auditor characteristics evaluated in prior research (e.g., Big 4 membership, office size, and industry expertise). In fact, our findings suggest that the positive association between auditor premiums and audit quality is better captured at the auditor level than it is at the auditor “tier,” office, auditor‐industry, or engagement levels. In sum, our results suggest that auditors charging higher fees, on average, deliver superior levels of financial statement assurance, but engagement‐specific fee premiums do not reflect quality‐enhancing audit effort. These contrasting results provide a possible explanation for the mixed findings in prior research.

We investigate the effect of executives and directors with prior banking crisis experience on bank outcomes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Executives and directors with previous experience leading banks through a bank crisis may have been uniquely able to understand the risks, recognize the warnings signs early, and thus respond more effectively to the GFC. Controlling for other executive, director, and bank‐level characteristics, we examine whether bank performance, risk taking, and accounting quality in the period immediately before and during the GFC are affected by having executives or directors who previously served as bank executives or directors during the 1980s/1990s banking crisis (80s/90s crisis). Overall, we find that banks led by these crisis‐experienced executives and directors exhibit stronger performance, lower risk taking, and higher accounting quality in the period around the GFC. These effects are strongest among bank leaders for whom the 80s/90s crisis was most salient. Results are robust to propensity‐matched samples and other analyses performed to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest these individuals were able to learn from prior crisis experience.

One explanation for overpricing on asset markets is a lack of traders' self-control. Self-control is the individual capacity to override or inhibit undesired impulses that may drive prices. We implement the first experiment to address the causal relationship between self-control abilities and systematic overpricing on financial markets. Our setup can detect some of the channels through which individual self-control restrictions could transmit into irrational exuberance in markets. Our data indicate a large direct effect of restricted self-control abilities on market overpricing. Low self-control traders report stronger emotions after the market.

We examine whether an anticipated reduction in future repatriation taxes affects the amount of cash U.S. multinationals hold overseas. We find that the expected benefits of a repatriation tax reduction are positively associated with accelerated accumulations of global cash holdings once Congress proposed legislation. Additional tests examining domestic and foreign corporations, voluntary disclosures of foreign cash, and corporate payout behavior support our conclusion that observed increases in excess global cash are driven by changes in foreign cash. We also document that U.S. multinationals accumulating excess cash engage in complementary organizational and financial reporting activities designed to maximize expected tax benefits. Received December 7, 2017; editorial decision August 18, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Prior research finds that controls that induce cooperation among collaborators on a project increase trust, and that this increased trust increases subsequent cooperation among collaborators. We extend this work by investigating how controls influence cooperative behavior in two settings. The first is an interactive setting where people work together and can benefit from each other's work. The second is a non‐interactive setting where people do not work together directly but where behavior can be observed. We propose that because controls are likely to engender greater trust and reciprocity in interactive settings than in non‐interactive settings, the effect of controls on future cooperative behavior will be greater for controls in interactive settings than for controls in non‐interactive settings. We find that controls in both settings increase future cooperative behavior, but the effect is significantly greater in interactive settings (where reciprocity and trust are more likely to develop). Furthermore, this increased cooperation is observed in an uncontrolled task, suggesting that the control fosters trust in others rather than trust in the control. These findings suggest that the benefits of controls are more substantial in work environments characterized by extensive teamwork and where employees benefit from each other's work.

We develop a jump-diffusion model for pricing and hedging with margined options on futures. Unlike a standard equity option, margined options require no up-front payment. An attractive feature of margined options is that there is no early exercise premiums under general assumptions. Model parameter estimates and out-of-sample pricing errors are calculated using data on Brent crude contracts. Using the same pricing technology, we also hedge equity style options with margined options. Hedging coefficients are derived by matching an extended set of Greeks. We find that a target equity option can be effectively hedged using a portfolio of two margined options and the underlying. As has been reported elsewhere, a delta hedge is inappropriate when the underlying is a jump-diffusion.

The downtrend in U.S. interest rates over the past two decades may partly reflect a decline in the longer-run equilibrium real rate of interest. We examine this issue using dynamic term structure models that account for time-varying term and liquidity risk premiums and are estimated directly from prices of individual inflation-indexed bonds. Our finance-based approach avoids two potential pitfalls of previous macroeconomic analyses: structural breaks at the zero lower bound and misspecification of output and inflation dynamics. We estimate that the longer-run equilibrium real rate has fallen about 2 percentage points and appears unlikely to rise quickly.

Using exogenous wealth shocks stemming from the collapse of the housing market, we show that managers who experience substantial losses in their home values subsequently reduce risk in their delegated funds. The decline in fund risk comes through reductions in idiosyncratic risk and tracking error, suggesting that the behavior is likely driven by career concerns. Our paper provides evidence that idiosyncratic personal preferences affect mutual fund managers’ professional decisions and offers a methodology for testing for manager effects that is not subject to the selection critique of Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013). Received March 30, 2016; editorial decision February 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Editor Itay Goldstein.

Large international differences in the price of labor can be sustained by differences between workers or by natural and policy barriers to worker mobility. We use migrant selection theory and evidence to place lower bounds on the ad valorem equivalent of labor mobility barriers to the United States, with unique nationally representative microdata on both U.S. immigrant workers and workers in their 42 home countries. The average price equivalent of migration barriers in this setting for low-skill men is greater than $13,700 per worker per year. Natural and policy barriers may each create annual global losses of trillions of dollars.