With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.

We are quick to add, however, that the difference in estimated OJT across the two groups is not large in 1966. In fact, H(1966)ID=1 H(1966)|D=O = $0.55 (with a standard error of $0.67) so that the difference is relatively small and the standard error is quite large. The conclusion is then that for this early period, the measured wage differential underestimates the true differential, but the extent of that understatement is questionable. [p. 559]

The theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm-specific skills. The theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm. A broader approach lets all skills be general, but firms use them with different weights attached. For example, computer programming, economics, and accounting are general skills, but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three. One implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market. Another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training.

Some have observed that individuals perform worse after being promoted. The Peter principle, which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence, suggests that something is fundamentally misaligned in the promotion process. This view is unnecessary and inconsistent with the data. Below, it is argued that ability appears lower after promotion purely as a statistical matter. Being promoted is evidence that a standard has been met. Regression to the mean implies that future ability will be lower, on average. Firms optimally account for the regression bias in making promotion decisions, but the effect is never eliminated. Rather than evidence of a mistake, the Peter principle is a necessary consequence of any promotion rule. Furthermore, firms that take it into account appropriately adopt an optimal strategy. Usually, firms inflate the promotion criterion to offset the Peter principle effect, and the more important the transitory component is relative to total variation in ability, the larger the amount that the standard is inflated. The same logic applies to other situations. For example, it explains why movie sequels are worse than the original film on which they are based and why second visits to restaurants are less rewarding than the first.