We examine the impact of different types of oil price volatility shocks on firm’s systemic risk using a large panel dataset of US firms. Oil price volatility shocks occur due to changes in supply or demand for oil, or through idiosyncratic fluctuations of oil prices. Our findings indicate that the supply-driven or idiosyncratic oil price volatility shocks reduce systemic risk, whereas demand-driven shocks have the opposite effect. Large-cap and high-beta firms amplify the impact of oil price volatility shocks on firms’ systemic risk. Importantly, firms with extensive supply chain networks exacerbate systemic risk when facing demand-driven oil price volatility shocks.

For many firms, voluntarily delisting from a stock exchange can be optimal. We model an entrepreneur's incentives to voluntarily delist the firm as a trade-off between consumption of private benefits when listed and expected improvements in the firm's performance after delisting. Our model allows for heterogeneity across firms and countries, and various micro and macro shocks affect the delisting decision. Such a model makes novel predictions regarding the delisting patterns around the world. We empirically confirm these predictions using manually collected delisting data from 26 countries. Increasing policy and regulatory uncertainties can partially explain the greater popularity of voluntary delistings.