We find that heightened cross-border bank flows are associated with lower systemic risk in a target country’s banking system. The reductions in systemic risk are stronger for flows coming from source countries with stronger regulatory oversight than the target country. Such cross-border bank flows linked to regulatory arbitrage are also associated with improvements in target banking sector profitability, asset quality, and efficiency. We assess several alternative channels of influence for cross-border bank flows but interpret the evidence on these flows as mostly consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage.

This paper re-examines the extent to which gains from international diversification are due to differences in industrial structure across countries. Recent papers by Roll (1992), Journal of Finance 47, 3–42 and Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), Journal of Financial Economics 36, 3–27 investigate this issue and find conflicting evidence. Using a new database, the Dow Jones World Stock Index, with coverage in 25 countries and over 66 industry classifications, we decompose comprehensively both country and industrial sources of variation. We confirm that little of the variation in country index returns can be explained by their industrial composition. We also uncover differences in the proportion of variation in industry index returns that is captured by country and industry factors and discuss the implications for global diversification strategies.

We study how differences in bank regulation influence cross‐border bank acquisition flows and share price reactions to cross‐border deal announcements. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority cross‐border deals announced between 1995 and 2012, we find evidence of a form of “regulatory arbitrage” whereby acquisition flows involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than their targets. Target and aggregate abnormal returns around deal announcements are positive and larger when acquirers come from more restrictive bank regulatory environments. We interpret this evidence as more consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage than a potentially destructive one.

This article explores the fundamental factors that affect cross-country stock return correlations. Using transactions data from 1988 to 1992, we construct overnight and intraday returns for a portfolio of Japanese stocks using their NYSE-traded American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and a matched-sample portfolio of U. S. stocks. We find that U. S. macroeconomic announcements, shocks to the Yen/Dollar foreign exchange rate and Treasury bill returns, and industry effects have no measurable influence on U.S. and Japanese return correlations. However, large shocks to broad-based market indices (Nikkei Stock Average and Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index) positively impact both the magnitude and persistence of the return correlations.

This article explores the fundamental factors that affect cross‐country stock return correlations. Using transactions data from 1988 to 1992, we construct overnight and intraday returns for a portfolio of Japanese stocks using their NYSE‐traded American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and a matched‐sample portfolio of U. S. stocks. We find that U. S. macroeconomic announcements, shocks to the Yen/Dollar foreign exchange rate and Treasury bill returns, and industry effects have no measurable influence on U.S. and Japanese return correlations. However, large shocks to broad‐based market indices (Nikkei Stock Average and Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index) positively impact both the magnitude and persistence of the return correlations.

Relative to other countries, the U.S. now has abnormally few listed firms. This “U.S. listing gap” is consistent with a decrease in the net benefit of a listing for U.S. firms. Since the listing peak in 1996, the propensity to be listed is lower for all firm size categories and industries, the new list rate is low, and the delist rate is high. The high delist rate accounts for 46% of the listing gap and the low new list rate for 54%. The high delist rate is explained by an unusually high rate of acquisitions of publicly listed firms.

From 1990 to 2011, the share of world IPO activity by non-U.S. firms increased because of financial globalization and because of a decrease in U.S. IPO activity. Financial globalization reduces the impact of national institutions on domestic IPO activity and enables more non-U.S. firms from countries with weak institutions to go public with a global IPO. U.S. IPO activity does not benefit from financial globalization. Compared to other countries, the rate of small-firm IPO activity in the U.S. is abnormally low in the 2000s. This abnormally low rate cannot be explained by the regulatory changes of the early 2000s.

We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. We find that cross-listings have been falling on US exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London. This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics instead of by changes in the benefits of cross-listing. We show that after controlling for firm characteristics there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on US exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the valuation differential between listed and non-listed firms (the cross-listing premium) from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for US exchange listings every year, that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, and that it persists when allowing for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. In contrast, no premium exists for listings on London's Main Market in any year. Firms increase their capital-raising activities at home and abroad following a cross-listing on a major US exchange but not following a cross-listing in London. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms.

At the end of 1997, foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the U.S. had Tobin's q ratios that were 16.5% higher than the q ratios of non-cross-listed firms from the same country. The valuation difference is statistically significant and reaches 37% for those companies that list on major U.S. exchanges, even after controlling for a number of firm and country characteristics. We suggest that a U.S. listing reduces the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation and thereby increases the firm's ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. We show that growth opportunities are more highly valued for firms that choose to cross-list in the U.S., particularly those from countries with poorer investor rights.

Climate finance is the study of local and global financing of public and private investment that seeks to support mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. In 2017, the Review of Financial Studies launched a competition among scholars to develop research proposals on the topic with the goal of publishing this special volume. We describe the competition, how the nine projects featured in this volume came to be published, and frame their findings within what we view as a broader climate finance research program.