Recent microstructure research finds that liquidity risk, in particular its information component, plays an important role in explaining the post‐earnings‐announcement drift ( PEAD ). We decompose liquidity risk into an accounting‐associated component and a nonaccounting‐associated component and examine their relative importance in explaining PEAD . Our research is motivated by recent findings that liquidity risk is a systematic risk and earnings quality is negatively associated with liquidity risk. We find that the accounting‐associated component is more strongly related to PEAD returns than is its nonaccounting‐associated counterpart. Further analyses reveal that the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns is weaker for firms with greater analyst following. We also find that in a significant market downturn, the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns becomes more pronounced. Our study is the first to document a liquidity risk‐based role of accounting quality in explaining the PEAD phenomenon. It parses out the PEAD risk premia associated with accounting versus nonaccounting sources and, by so doing, sheds light on the role of accounting quality in shaping the liquidity risk‐ PEAD returns relation.

We provide evidence that analyst coverage increases as accruals quality decreases. This finding is consistent with the services of financial analysts becoming more valuable and in greater demand as accruals provide weaker signals about future cash flows. Further, it is accruals quality associated with innate uncertainty in the firm’s operating environment that attracts analysts even after controlling for operating uncertainty associated with cash flow and stock return volatility. This suggests that low quality accruals provide an opportunity for analysts to benefit from generating private information. Consistent with analysts providing compensating information, we find that forecasts for firms with lower accruals quality contain more private information.

We first examine whether analysts with certain characteristics that prior research has identified are related to superior forecasting ability systematically time their forecast revisions later in the fiscal quarter. We then examine whether this superior ability persists after controlling for the timing advantage by using relative forecast error, a measure that largely eliminates the timing advantage of recent forecasts. Using a sample of quarterly earnings forecast revisions over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009, we find that analysts with more firm-specific and general experience and more accurate prior-period forecasts, analysts employed by larger brokerage firms, and analysts who follow fewer industries and companies tend to revise forecasts later in the quarter. We also find that analyst characteristics that are positively correlated with revision timing are negatively related to relative forecast errors. These results are consistent with analyst characteristics being useful proxies for analyst forecasting ability and analysts with greater ability revising forecasts later in the quarter.

We study the relationship between societal trust and risk-taking in the banking industry. Prior literature has found that societal trust is positively related to both financial reporting conservatism and financial reporting transparency, which reduce bank managers’ ability to take excessive risk. Additionally, bank managers in high-trust countries are more likely to exhibit higher pro-social behavior and, therefore, less likely to take excessive risk for personal benefit. Consistent with these arguments, we document that banks in countries with higher societal trust exhibit lower risk-taking and that these banks also experienced less financial trouble and fewer failures during the 2007–2009 financial crisis.

We examine the relation between legal, extra-legal and political institutional factors and earnings quality of banks across countries. We predict that earnings quality is higher in countries with legal, extra-legal and political systems that reduce the consumption of private control benefits by insiders and afford outside investors greater protection. Using a sample of banks from 35 countries during the pre-crisis period from 1993 to 2006, we find that all five measures of earnings quality studied are higher in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and political institutional structures. We also find that banks in countries with stronger institutions are less likely to report losses, have lower loan loss provisions, and higher balance sheet strength during the 2007–2009 crisis period. Our findings highlight the implications of country level institutional factors for financial reporting quality and are relevant to bank regulators who are considering additional regulations on bank financial reporting.

We examine the unintended consequences of the 2005 increase from 500 million to 1 billion in the asset threshold for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control reporting requirements. We focus on a test sample of banks that increased their total assets from between 100 million and 500 million prior to the change in regulation to between 500 million and 1 billion within two years following the change. These “affected” banks are no longer subject to the internal control requirements but would have been had the regulation not been changed. We hypothesize that these affected banks are likely to make riskier loans, which will increase the likelihood of failure during the crisis period. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Affected banks have higher likelihood of failure during the crisis period than banks from two different control samples. We also find that auditor reputation (i.e., whether the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist auditor) has a moderating effect on the likelihood of failure for these affected banks.

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.

We examine the relation between auditor reputation and earnings management in banks using a sample of banks from 29 countries. In particular, we examine the implications of two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type and auditor industry specialization, for earnings management in banks. We find that both auditor type and auditor industry specialization moderate benchmark-beating (loss-avoidance and just-meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings) behavior in banks. In addition, we find that once auditor type and auditor industry specialization are included in the same tests, only auditor industry specialization has a significant impact on constraining benchmark-beating behavior. In separate tests related to income-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions, we find that both auditor type and auditor expertise constrain income-increasing earnings management. Again, in joint tests, only auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on constraining income-increasing earnings management.

We examine how auditor reputation conditions the market valuation of banks’ loan loss provision (LLP). The inherent uncertainty associated with and discretion permitted in estimating the LLP contributes to information asymmetry. The auditor’s certification and monitoring roles influence firm value by mitigating this information asymmetry. We examine two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type (Big 5 vs. non-Big 5) and auditor expertise, in the banking industry. We find a significant, positive association between the discretionary component of LLP and stock return for banks audited by the Big 5 auditors. Further analysis indicates that auditor expertise within banking and not auditor type drives this significant, positive association. Overall, our results are consistent with auditor expertise in the banking industry mitigating information asymmetry between bank managers and investors and enhancing the information conveyed by discretionary loan loss provision.