1. Introduction and Doctrinal Background Enter and Latitude for deterioration, and slack in economic thought Exit and voice as impersonations of economics and politics 2. Exit How the exit option works Competition as collusive behavior 3. Voice Voice as a residual of exit Voice as an alternative to exit 4. A Special Difficulty in Combining Exit and Voice 5. How Monopoly Can be Comforted by Competition 6. On Spatial Duopoly and the Dynamics of Two-Party Systems 7. A Theory of Loyalty The activation of voice as a function of loyalty Loyalist behavior as modified by severe initiation and high penalties for exit Loyalty and the difficult exit from public goods (and evils) 8. Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice 9. The Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice Appendixes A. A simple diagrammatic representation of voice and exit B. The choice between voice and exit C. The reversal phenomenon D. Consumer reactions to price rise and quality decline in the case of several connoisseur goods F. The effects of severity of initiation on activism: design for an experiment (in collaboration with Philip G. Zimbardo and Mark Snyder) Index

This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is not paid to any other person, a very small budget surplus results. Applications to both discrete and continuous decisions are illustrated.

This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is not paid to any other person, a very small budget surplus results. Applications to both discrete and continuous decisions are illustrated.

Journal Article On the Income Distribution as a Public Good Get access Harold M. Hochman, Harold M. Hochman The Urban Institute Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar James D. Rodgers, James D. Rodgers Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Gordon Tullock Gordon Tullock Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 87, Issue 2, May 1973, Pages 311–315, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882193 Published: 01 May 1973