This paper investigates the relation between industry‐wide information disclosures by the trade association for the semiconductor industry and both share prices and analyst forecasts. Such disclosures may have little impact on investors and analysts, since prior theoretical research suggests that trade associations may be unable to secure reliable data from firms in an industry. At the same time, such disclosures may be important, since prior empirical research suggests that share prices and analyst forecasts reflect industry‐wide earnings effects earlier than firm‐specific effects. We document significant stock price movements on release dates of industry Flash Reports by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) each month that contain aggregate industry data on new orders and shipments. The magnitude of the price revisions on Flash Report disclosure dates is positively associated with changes in the numbers disclosed and varies across sample firms in a manner associated with identifiable characteristics of the firms. Further tests indicate that the Flash Report provides mainly forward‐looking information on new orders that is linked to firm‐specific sales changes and has explanatory power for quarterly stock prices beyond firm‐specific earnings. This information is used by security analysts mainly in assessing the persistence of firm‐specific quarterly sales changes. Our findings support the hypothesis that the SIA is able to obtain data from firms, compile it into reliable aggregate statistics, and then distribute these statistics in a timely fashion.

This paper examines the properties of corporate disclosure and price discovery associated with NYSE temporary trading halts. We address the hypothesis that managers release highly informative disclosures outside of trading hours or seek a trading halt to allow investors greater opportunity to assess the implications of new information. We investigate whether: (a) disclosures associated with trading halts are highly price informative, and (b) the process of price discovery as reflected in specialist indications is more protracted and difficult for extreme and bad news halts. We find that halts arise from non‐routine highly informative disclosures for which price discovery is more uncertain and protracted. First, most disclosures associated with our sample of trading halts are ones whose arrival investors cannot predict but which have large valuation effects (e.g., corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts). Second, halts associated with large price changes exhibit more uncertain and protracted price discovery during the halt. Specialist indications for extreme news halts have (1) bigger differences between high and low prices, (2) poorer predictive accuracy with respect to opening price, and (3) greater frequency. Finally, similar comparisons for bad and good news only weakly support the conjecture that bad news is associated with more certain and protracted price discovery. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent les propriétés des renseignements fournis par les sociétés et de la supputation des cours en période d'arrêt temporaire des opérations de la Bourse de New York. Ils se penchent sur l'hypothèse selon laquelle les gestionnaires publient des renseignements très informatifs en dehors des heures d'activite ou en période d'arrêt des opérations, de façon à donner aux investisseurs tout le loisir d'évaluer les conséquences de ces renseignements. Les auteurs se demandent 1) si l'information publiée en période d'arrêt des opérations est très éclairante sur les cours et b) si le processus de supputation du cours tel que l'illustrent les indications des spécialistes est plus long et plus difficile lorsque les arrêts sont associés à des renseignements qui entraînent des variations du cours d'une grande amplitude ou des variations du cours négatives. Selon les auteurs, il y a arrêt des opérations lorsque les renseignements publiés sortent de l'ordinaire et que leur contenu en information est élevé, si bien que le processus de supputation du cours est plus incertain et plus long. Premièrement, la plupart des déclarations associées à notre échantillon d'arrêts des opérations sont de nature telle qu'il était impossible pour les investisseurs d'en prédire l'occurrence, mais ont des conséquences majeures sur l'évaluation de l'entreprise (par exemple, les prises de contrôle et les prises de contrôle adossées). Deuxièmement, les arrêts des opérations correspondant à d'importantes variations du cours sont caractérisés par un processus de supputation du prix plus incertain et plus long. Les indications des spécialistes en ce qui a trait aux arrêts des opérations associés à des renseignements qui entraînent des variations du cours d'une grande amplitude présentent 1) un écart plus grand entre cours élevé et cours faible, 2) moins de précision dans les prédictions relatives au cours d'ouverture et 3) une fréquence supérieure. Enfin, des comparaisons analogues en ce qui a trait aux renseignements positifs et aux renseignements négatifs corroborent seulement faiblement l'hypothèse selon laquelle les renseignements négatifs rendent la processus de supputation du cours plus certain et plus long.

Scholars have long suspected that people behave differently when their actions will be observed by or revealed to others. We hypothesize that financial reporting that reveals managers' actions will lead managers to take actions that better align with investor interests. We test this hypothesis with an experiment in which we manipulate the availability of a financial report that reveals managerial actions. Our evidence shows that financial reporting leads a manager to choose reinvestment and resource-sharing actions that better align with investor interests, even when the investor can impose no cost or confer no reward on the manager. This effect holds when the investor can shut down the firm and take a sizable portion of the assets. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting's economic value comes not only from its traditional contracting function, but also because managers care about investors' moral evaluations of them that are enabled by reporting.

ABSTRACT A common view is that verified earnings reports encourage investment through improved transparency. We lack direct evidence on this foundational proposition because researchers cannot observe counterfactuals in which a manager either (i) must remain silent about performance or (ii) can make any statement about performance they desire, even a bald‐faced lie. We experimentally manipulate whether a manager can provide information to an investor by voluntarily disclosing a verified earnings report, communicating freely via unverifiable cheap talk, or both. Our experiment involves repeated interactions between an uninformed investor with funds that, if invested, generate uncertain gains, and a trustee‐manager who observes and then divides gains after they are realized. We hypothesize and find that (i) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to higher investment compared with a world in which reporting is not possible and (ii) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to more accurate cheap talk communication than when earnings reports are unavailable. Contrary to our prediction, we find that investment when both earnings reports and cheap talk are possible is statistically indistinguishable from investment when only cheap talk communication is available. Further tests reveal that a lack of verified earnings reports leads managers to sustain a partner's investment by providing high returns to the investor while also limiting (but not completely eliminating) deceptive communication and profit‐taking. Our main conclusion is that verified earnings reports promote investment on a stand‐alone basis by improving transparency, but the effect of greater transparency from earnings reports on investment is more nuanced when earnings reports can influence the disclosure of unverifiable information. The main implication of our evidence is that the greater transparency of management behavior with verified earnings reports is not unambiguously positive because making behavior more transparent can lead managers to change their behavior.

This paper examines the stock price effects of alternative types of management earnings forecasts. Beyond deciding whether to disclose forecasts, managers must decide whether to issue a point projection or a more qualitative estimate (e.g., a bounded range), and whether to project interim or annual earnings or both. Our empirical tests assess differences in the information content of management earnings forecasts that differ by form and horizon. Our tests provide a comprehensive investigation of the price effects of these alternative forecast disclosure types. While an extensive literature exists on the relation between management forecasts and stock prices, most previous studies examine only point and range forecasts of annual earnings (e.g.. Penman 1980; Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Waymire 1984; McNichols 1989; Pownall and Waymire 1989). Exceptions include Lev and Penman (1990), Patell (1976), and Baginski et al. (1993). Lev and Penman (1990) include lower and upper bound forecasts for part of their sample period, but do not examine these disclosure forms separately. Patell (1976) provides evidence on mean price changes associated with a pooled sample of annual minimum and maximum forecasts. Baginski et al. (1993) examine alternative forecast forms. Prior analyses of managers' disclosure incentives speculate that investors may condition their assessment of forecast information on disclosure form and horizon. For instance, King et al. (1990) suggest that forecast disclosures emerge as voluntary managerial actions to reduce costly information asymmetry in capital markets. Under the "expectations adjustment" hypothesis, managers have incentives to acquire and maintain a reputation for credible disclosure. Rational investors recognize that disclosure quality varies systematically by disclosure form and will discount qualitative projections or those issued with longer horizons. Policy debates on mandatory disclosure of qualitative information, such as the recent SEC debates over the content of "Management Discussion and Analysis" disclosures, and deliberations on forecast disclosure in the 1970s (see King et al. 1990), also suggest a need for evidence on the information content of qualitative prospective disclosures and alternative forms of forecasts. Our primary tests are based on a sample of 1,252 forecasts disclosed by 91 firms between July 1, 1979 and December 31, 1987. Several conclusions emerge from these tests. First, forecast disclosures remain highly informative even when including other disclosure types not analyzed in prior studies. Second, forecasts are less informative than earnings announcements for our full sample, a finding that is inconsistent with earlier results in Pownall and Waymire (1989). Third, differences across forecast forms are not significant at conventional levels. Fourth, interim forecasts are significantly more informative than annual projections. This result is driven largely by maximum forecasts, which are highly informative and more frequent in the interim forecast subsample. We document several additional regularities that may be of interest to researchers. First, point and range annual forecasts comprise less than 20 percent of our sample. This suggests that the incidence of voluntary management forecast disclosure is possibly far greater than suggested by previous studies. Second, range forecasts tend to be quite inaccurate ex post. Actual earnings per share (EPS) fell outside the forecasted bounds in more than 50 percent of our range forecasts. Third, forecasts that are more qualitative tend to be issued over longer horizons. Minimum forecasts are issued over the longest horizons for our sample, and interim point projections have the shortest horizons. Finally, extensions to our primary tests provide some evidence that maximum forecasts have significant negative price effects, and that for point forecasts, forecast revisions are highly informative.