Analysis of absence of arbitrage normally ignores payoffs in states to which the agent assigns zero probability. We extend the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to the case of “no empty promises” in which the agent cannot promise arbitrarily large payments in some states. There is a superpositive pricing rule that can assign positive price to claims in zero probability states important to the market as well as assigning positive prices to claims in the states of positive probability. With continuous information arrival, no empty promises can be enforced by shutting down the agent's subsequent investments once wealth hits zero.

This study examines whether client satisfaction can help explain cross‐sectional variation in Big 6 audit fees paid by Fortune 1000 clients. After controlling for other factors related to audit fees (including audit quality attributes), client satisfaction with the audit team is positively associated with fees. It appears that a dimension of client satisfaction unrelated to audit quality attributes is the factor associated with an audit fee premium. This dimension of satisfaction may reflect other aspects of service quality not documented in the literature, or it may simply enable an auditor to earn economic rents through enhanced bargaining power. Client satisfaction with the audit firm does not appear to be priced in this segment of the audit market. The results are consistent with the view that a Big 6 audit is a service that is differentiable in the eyes of client management, and the results highlight the importance of the audit team composition in allowing a Big 6 audit firm to differentiate the audit product. Also, if auditors are earning local rents due to enhanced satisfaction levels, then a perfect competition model may not be appropriate for the audit services market.

We estimate the relative influence of trade versus technology on wages in a “large-country” setting, where technological change affects product prices. Trade is measured by the foreign outsourcing of intermediate inputs, while technological change is measured by expenditures on high-technology capital such as computers. The estimation procedure we develop, which modifies the conventional “price regression,” is able to distinguish whether product price changes are due to factor-biased versus sector-biased technology shifts. In our base specification we find that computers explain about 35 percent of the increase in the relative wage of nonproduction workers, while outsourcing explains 15 percent; both of these effects are higher in other specifications.

The relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate. On January 20, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with Nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders. Additionally, superior quotes placed by Nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the Nasdaq market. We measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance, including trading costs and depths. Our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality.

Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders) about the value of the item. With inexperienced bidders, having an insider does not materially reduce the severity of the winner's curse compared to auctions with a symmetric information structure (SIS). In contrast, super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the winner's curse, satisfy the comparative static predictions of equilibrium bidding theory: (i) average seller's revenue is larger with an insider than in SIS auctions, (ii) insiders make substantially greater profits, conditional on winning, than outsiders, and (iii) insiders increase their bids in response to more rivals. Further, changes in insiders' bids are consistent with directional learning theory (Selten and Buchta (1994)).

This paper examines the relation between expected stock returns and their conditional volatility over different holding periods and across different states of the economy. Seminonparametric density estimation and Monte Carlo integration are used to obtain the expected returns and conditional volatility at various holding intervals. We uncover a significantly positive risk and return relation at long holding intervals, such as one and two years, which is nonexistent at short holding periods such as one month. We also show that the existing finding in the literature of a negative risk and return relation may be attributable to misspecification.

This paper examines the roles played by innovations identified from a simple four-variable VAR characterized by cointegration. Using knowledge of cointegration rank and “textbook” relations that link macroeconomic aggregates, we identify distinct “real” and “nominal” innovations that dictate the long-run behavior of the model. We also examine the explanatory power of transitory innovations that are orthogonal to these permanent shocks. One of the permanent shocks displays all the characteristics of a technology or “supply” innovation, while one of the transitory innovations—identified by imposing short-run price rigid-ity—is interpretable as a “demand” side impulse. The permanent nominal shock bears the imprint of an innovation in aggregate inflation expectations. Historical decomposition and comparison with variables that are external to the model reveals the relative importance of the shocks at various episodes.

This study identifies conditions under which the audit risk model does, and does not, describe audit-planning (investment and pricing) decisions. In an experiment, audit partners and managers examined one of two cases where a material misstatement—error or irregularity—was discovered. The auditors assessed the elements of the audit risk model, assessed business risk and provided recommendations for the audit investment and fee. When the likelihood of an error was high, the audit risk model dominated business risk in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee did not contain a risk premium. When the likelihood of an irregularity was high, business risk dominated the audit risk model in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee contained a risk premium. These results suggest that the ability of the audit risk model to describe auditor behavior and the inclination of auditors to charge a risk premium depend upon the nature of the risks present in the audit. In the presence of errors, the audit risk model adequately described audit-planning decisions; in the presence of irregularities it did not.

Portfolio turnpike theorems show that if preferences at large wealth levels are similar to power utility, then the investment strategy converges to the power utility strategy as the horizon increases. We state and prove two simple and general portfolio turnpike theorems. Unlike existing literature, our main result does not assume independence of returns and depends only on discounting of future cash flows. We also provide a critique of portfolio turnpike results, based on the observations that (1) the time required for convergence is often too large to be relevant, and (2) there is no convergence for consumption withdrawal problems. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.