In this study we show that both the price impact of trades and serial correlation in trade direction are positively and significantly related to the probability of information-based trading (PIN). The positive relation remains significant even after controlling for the effects of stock attributes. Higher trading activity (i.e., shorter intervals between trades) induces both larger price impact and stronger positive serial correlation in trade direction. The effect of time interval between trades on quote revision is stronger for stocks with higher PIN values. These results provide direct empirical support for the information models of trade and quote revision.

In bridging the technology gap with the OECD nations, developing economies have access to three avenues of technological advance: domestic R&D, technology transfer, and foreign direct investment. This paper examines the contributions of each of these avenues, as well as their interactions, to productivity within Chinese industry. Based on a large data set for China's large and medium-size enterprises, the estimation results show that in-house R&D significantly complements technology transfer—whether of domestic or foreign origin. Foreign direct investment, which we assume is an important channel of proprietary technology transfer, does not facilitate the transfer of market-mediated foreign technology.

We develop a simple model of international outsourcing and apply it to processing trade in China. Export processing involves a foreign firm contracting with a Chinese factory manager to assemble intermediate inputs into a final product. Whether the same or different parties should have ownership of the processing factory and control over input purchases depends on parameters of the model, which we estimate. We find that multinational firms engaged in export processing in China tend to split factory ownership and input control with local managers: the most common outcome is to have foreign factory ownership but Chinese control over input purchases. Consistent with our model, this pattern is especially prevalent in the southern coastal provinces, where export markets are thickest and contracting costs are lowest.

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.

We examine the optimal dynamic portfolio decisions for investors who acquire housing services from either renting or owning a house. Our results show that when indifferent between owning and renting, investors owning a house hold a lower equity proportion in their net worth (bonds, stocks, and home equity), reflecting the substitution effect, yet hold a higher equity proportion in their liquid portfolios (bonds and stocks), reflecting the diversification effect. Furthermore, following the suboptimal policy of always renting leads investors to overweigh in stocks, while following the suboptimal policy of always owning a house causes investors to underweigh in stocks.

We show the importance of a dynamic aggregation bias in accounting for the PPP puzzle. We prove that the aggregate real exchange rate is persistent because its components have heterogeneous dynamics. Established time series and panel methods fail to control for this. Using Eurostat data, we find that when heterogeneity is taken into account, the estimated persistence of real exchange rates falls dramatically. Its half-life, for instance, may fall to as low as eleven months, significantly below the “consensus view” of three to five years.

The Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) regularly reviews books of interest to the economics profession. The Economic Report of the President (ERP) falls under that purview and beginning this year, the JEL will be reviewing the ERP. Toward that end, I have asked a handful of very prominent economists to review the 2005 ERP. Reviewers were chosen to reflect expertise on what I guessed would be key issues. Reviewers were given the following instructions: The ERP in principle should provide an accurate assessment of the consensus professional views of economists on any given issue, based on the research to date. Does the discussion in the ERP in fact accurately summarize what we as economists know? Reviewers were given free rein over what material they would review in the ERP but were urged to focus on their areas of particular expertise. In the reviews that follow, Joel Slemrod reviews the discussion of tax reform. Joe Farrell reviews the ERP's chapter titled “Innovation and the Information Economy.” Gordon Hanson reviews the chapters on international trade and on immigration. Robert Hall reviews the discussion of the adverse macroeconomic impact of rising oil prices while Jonathan Gruber reviews the ERP chapter titled “Expanding Individual Choice and Control.” Many thanks to the reviewers for the quick turnaround.

There is a large body of literature that concludes that—when confronted with increased competition—banks rationally choose more risky portfolios. We argue that this literature has had a significant influence on regulators and central bankers. We review the empirical literature and conclude that the evidence is best described as “mixed.” We then show that existing theoretical analyses of this topic are fragile, since there exist fundamental risk‐incentive mechanisms that operate in exactly the opposite direction, causing banks to become more risky as their markets become more concentrated. These mechanisms should be essential ingredients of models of bank competition.

This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios. Under our central parameter values, and with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $0.95/gal for the US and $1.29/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative plausible parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due almost entirely to a higher assumed value for marginal congestion cost. Revenue-raising needs, incorporated in a “Ramsey" component, also play a significant role, as do accident externalities and local air pollution. However, we also find that a shift in taxation off gasoline and onto vehicle miles can produce much larger welfare gains than those from implementing second-best optimal gasoline taxes.

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: when (1) there exists an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries.