[This article studies differences in the information content of 870,000 news announcements in 56 markets around the world. In most developed markets, a firm's stock price moves much more on days with public news about the firm. In contrast, in many emerging markets volatility is similar on news and non-news days. We examine several hypotheses for our findings. Cross-country differences in stock price reactions are best explained by insider trading, followed by differences in the quality of the news dissemination mechanism. Our findings are useful for quantifying the extent of insider trading and how the financial media affects international markets.]

I find that economically meaningless index labels cause stock returns to covary in excess of fundamentals. S&P/Barra follow a simple mechanical procedure to define their Value and Growth indices. In doing so, they reclassify some stocks from Value to Growth even after their book‐to‐market ratios have risen, and vice versa. Such stocks begin to covary more with the index they join and less with the index they leave. Backdated constituent data from Barra reveal no such label‐related shifts in comovement during the 10 years prior to the actual introduction of the indices in 1992.

In this study we examine the relation between corporate governance and institutional ownership. Our empirical results show that the fraction of a company’s shares that are held by institutional investors increases with the quality of its governance structure. In a similar vein, we show that the proportion of institutions that hold a firm’s shares increases with its governance quality. Our results are robust to different estimation methods and alternative model specifications. These results are consistent with the conjecture that institutional investors gravitate to stocks of companies with good governance structure to meet fiduciary responsibility as well as to minimize monitoring and exit costs.

We document market anticipation of merger bids and show that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. Subsequent bidders in the industry experience significant and positive abnormal returns around the time of initial industry bid announcements. These results suggest that announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding. After accounting for anticipation, bidding activity is, on average, a significant wealth-creating event. Moreover, bidders pursuing public targets increase shareholder wealth and bidders in stock swaps do not lose. These results contradict conventional wisdom. Our results shed light on the correct magnitude of acquisition returns and on the transfer of information throughout an industry around the time of an economic shock.

It is well known that augmenting a standard linear regression model with variables that are correlated with the error term but uncorrelated with the original regressors will increase the asymptotic efficiency of the original coefficients. We argue that in the context of predicting excess returns, valid augmenting variables exist and are likely to yield substantial gains in estimation efficiency and, hence, predictive accuracy. The proposed augmenting variables are ex post measures of an unforecastable component of excess returns: ex post errors from macroeconomic survey forecasts, the surprise components of asset price movements around macroeconomic news announcements, or even the weather. These “surprises” cannot be used directly in forecasting—they are not observed at the time that the forecast is made—but can nonetheless improve forecasting accuracy by reducing parameter estimation uncertainty. We derive formal results about the benefits and limits of this approach and apply it to standard examples of forecasting excess bond and equity returns. We find substantial improvements in out-of-sample forecast accuracy for standard excess bond return regressions; gains for forecasting excess stock returns are much smaller.

We investigate the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility in a multi-asset, multi-period noisy rational expectations equilibrium. We show that the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility is either U-shaped or negative. Using several price informativeness measures, we empirically document a U-shaped relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility. Our study therefore reconciles the opposing views in the following two strands of literature: (1) the growing body of research showing that firms with more informative stock prices have greater idiosyncratic return volatility, and (2) the studies arguing that more information in price reduces idiosyncratic return volatility.

A key rationale offered by the Federal Reserve for the payment of interest on reserves was to remove the incentive for banks to operate sweep accounts. Sweeping shifts funds from transactions deposits subject to reserve requirements to non-reservable deposits. This paper extends a conventional banking model to analyze sweeping behavior. Sweeping responds positively to increases in bank loan rates and reserve ratios and negatively to increases in the interest rate on reserves or exogenous increases in bank equity. Sweeping generates greater responsiveness in lending to changes in loan rates or the interest rate on reserves and lower responsiveness to changes in reserve ratios or equity than in its absence. Empirical analysis of an explicit condition that we derive suggests that, with an unchanged reserve requirement, the Fed could eliminate sweeping by setting the interest rate on reserves to no less than approximately 4% points below the market loan rate.

This paper examines the market-price to book-value ratio for 6604 bank stock observations from December 31, 2006 through June 30, 2009. We relate each bank’s market-price to book-value ratio to several fundamental ratios and whether the bank took funds from the US Treasury under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results of this study show that banks who took TARP funds have lower market-price to book-value ratios. In addition, lower relative costs, higher non-interest income, and lower assets in non-accrual or foreclosed status are associated with higher market-price to book-value ratios while controlling for size and other bank attributes.

Many developing countries use food-price subsidies or controls to improve nutrition. However, subsidizing goods on which households spend a high proportion of their budget can create large wealth effects. Consumers may then substitute towards foods with higher non-nutritional attributes (e.g., taste), but lower nutritional content per unit of currency, weakening or perhaps even reversing the subsidy's intended impact. We analyze data from a randomized program of large price subsidies for poor households in two provinces of China and find no evidence that the subsidies improved nutrition. In fact, it may have had a negative impact for some households.