We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

[This article develops a Kalman filter model to track dynamic mutual fund factor loadings. It then uses the estimates to analyze whether managers with market-timing ability can be identified ex ante. The primary findings are as follows: (i) Ordinary least squares (OLS) timing models produce false positives (nonzero alphas) at too high a rate with either daily or monthly data. In contrast, the Kalman filter model produces them at approximately the correct rate with monthly data; (ii) In monthly data, though the OLS models fail to detect any timing among fund managers, the Kalman filter does; (iii) The alpha and beta forecasts from the Kalman model are more accurate than those from the OLS timing models; (iv) The Kalman filter model tracks most fund alphas and betas better than OLS models that employ macroeconomic variables in addition to fund returns.]

[This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody' s KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.]

[We provide a model-free test for asymmetric correlations in which stocks move more often with the market when the market goes down than when it goes up, and also provide such tests for asymmetric betas and covariances. When stocks are sorted by size, book-to-market, and momentum, we find strong evidence of asymmetries for both size and momentum portfolios, but no evidence for book-to-market portfolios. Moreover, we evaluate the economic significance of incorporating asymmetries into investment decisions, and find that they can be of substantial economic importance for an investor with a disappointment aversion (DA) preference as described by Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2005).]

We find that analysts' forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term under performance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts' credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency.

[We present a model in which some of the firm's information ("news") can be disclosed verifiably and some information ("type") cannot, to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-type firms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-type firms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parameter values, this equilibrium exists when other more traditional equilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements. The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidence concerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides some new empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosure requirements may have the undesirable consequence of making it more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannot be disclosed credibly.]

The article presents information on the effect of auditor changes on security prices in both a mechanical decision rule and in the possibility that an adverse audit opinion may lead to dismissal. The analysis implies that the stock price response to the announcement of an auditor change depends on the preswitch audit opinion. The author contends that his research proves auditor switches can be good for investors and that even when they are costless, and there is no collusion between auditor and firm, market reaction can be negative.

We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.

This paper proposes three classes of consistent tests for serial correlation of the residuals from a linear dynamic regression model. The tests are obtained by comparing a kernel-based spectral density estimator and the null spectral density using three divergence measures. The null normal distributions are invariant whether the regressors include lagged dependent variables. Both asymptotic local and global power properties are investigated. G. Box and D. Pierce's (1970) test can be viewed as a test based on the truncated kernel; many other kernels deliver better power than Box and Pierce's test. A simulation study shows that the new tests have good power against weak and strong dependence. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.