[We investigate whether stock betas vary with the release of firm-specific news. Using daily firm-level betas estimated from intraday prices, we find that betas increase on earnings announcement days and revert to their average levels two to five days later. The increase in betas is greater for earnings announcements that have larger positive or negative surprises, convey more information about other firms in the market, and resolve greater ex ante uncertainty. Our results are consistent with a learning model in which investors use information on announcing firms to revise their expectations about the profitability of the aggregate economy.]

We examine several alternative models of the UK gilt yield curve using daily data for the period 12 July 1996–10 February 2010. We select the best models according to two criteria: low out of sample errors in pricing bonds and low curvature of the implied forward rate curve function. We suggest additions to some of the models that significantly improve their performance. Some of the new models out perform those typically used by the central banks. In particular this paper suggests that the model used by the Canadian Central Bank which both outperforms other models and is particularly easy to estimate, is well suited to the UK gilt market.

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.

Firms that intentionally increase leverage through substantial debt issuances do so primarily as a response to operating needs rather than a desire to make a large equity payout. Subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of proactive attempts to rebalance the firm’s capital structure toward a long-run target. Instead, the evolution of the firm’s leverage ratio depends primarily on whether or not the firm produces a financial surplus. In fact, firms that generate subsequent deficits tend to cover these deficits predominantly with more debt even though they exhibit leverage ratios that are well above estimated target levels. Our findings are broadly consistent with a capital structure theory in which financial flexibility, in the form of unused debt capacity, plays an important role in capital structure choices. (JEL G32) The search for an empirically viable capital structure theory has confounded financial economists for decades. Standard trade-off models of capital structure have been criticized on the grounds that they do a poor job of explaining observed debt ratios. For example, traditional trade-off models have difficulty explaining why firms tend to issue stock after exogenous decreases in leverage

[We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world. Many features of governance and compensation that have caused consternation among commentators arise naturally in this dynamic setting, even though boards are rational and managers are powerless. Compensation changes depend on changes in the evolution of a latent state variable outside the manager's control.Board passivity is positively correlated with both the value of management compensation and the firm's good fortune. Managerial opportunism tends to follow sudden reversals of good fortune. Moreover, managerial private benefits, by increasing managers' stake in the long-run viability of the firm, may actually ameliorate agency conflicts.]

[Firms that intentionally increase leverage through substantial debt issuances do so primarily as a response to operating needs rather than a desire to make a large equity payout. Subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of proactive attempts to rebalance the firm's capital structure toward a long-run target. Instead, the evolution of the firm's leverage ratio depends primarily on whether or not the firm produces a financial surplus. In fact, firms that generate subsequent deficits tend to cover these deficits predominantly with more debt even though they exhibit leverage ratios that are well above estimated target levels. Our findings are broadly consistent with a capital structure theory in which financial flexibility, in the form of unused debt capacity, plays an important role in capital structure choices.]

Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods so that each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one or two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added every fifth or sixth year and, consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of predictable forecast errors and stock returns in 14-week quarters, suggesting that analysts and investors do not, on average, adjust their expectations for the extra week. The ease with which 14-week quarters can be predicted, and expectations adjusted, suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of analysts and investors.

This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. Estimates also indicate that firms with fewer debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. These findings lend strong support to the efficient contracting hypothesis. The conflicting interests of corporate stakeholders, especially between stockholders and creditors, encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like return on assets (ROA) that will strike the optimal balance between the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity. Data availability: all data are available from public sources.

This paper analyses the possibility and the consequences of rational bubbles in a dynamic economy where financially constrained firms demand and supply liquidity. Bubbles are more likely to emerge, the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity and the more limited the pledgeability of corporate income; they crowd investment in (out) when liquidity is abundant (scarce). We analyse extensions with firm heterogeneity and stochastic bubbles.