Abstract not available

Gary C. Sanger, John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 1-25

Futures contracts often include a variety of delivery options that allow participants flexibility in satisfying the contract. These options have the potential to broaden the appeal of the contact. However, if these options are valuable, they may reduce the hedging effectiveness of the contract. This article analyzes the GNMA CDR futures contract that appears to have failed because of flaws in the contract's design. For the first 6 years following its introduction, the contract attracted significant and increasing volume, but, subsequently, the volume declined to almost zero. Over the years during which the volume experienced its most dramatic decline, the Treasury-bond futures contract provided a better hedge for current coupon GNMA securities than did the GNMA CDR futures contract. And, over this same period, the value of the quality option embedded in the contract often exceeded 5 percent of the futures price and reached a level of 19 percent at one point. We interpret the evidence to indicate that the contract failed because the delivery options reduced the hedging effectiveness of the contract for current coupon mortgage securities.

Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers are associated with a negative average stock price reaction. We address two questions: Why do firms undertake debt-reducing exchange offers? And, what is the information conveyed by such offers? The answers are interrelated: Debt-reducing exchange offers are undertaken by financially weak firms in an effort to stave off further financial distress and, thereby, preserve value for shareholders. A successfully completed exchange offer significantly reduces the likelihood that a firm will enter Chapter 11. Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers apparently contain two pieces of information: (1) the firm is financially weaker than would have been apparent from other publicly available information, and (2) management is attempting to preserve value for shareholders.

We investigate the relation between corporate value and the proportion of the board made up of independent directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries. We find a positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board. The cost to the dominant shareholder of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus, not all dominant shareholders choose independent boards.

Using end-of-month bid-ask spreads for 540 NYSE stocks over the period 1982-87, the authors document a seasonal pattern in which both relative and absolute spreads decline from the end of December to the end of the following January. Cross-sectional regressions do not, however, provide evidence of a significant correlation between changes in spreads at the turn of the year and January stock returns. Either there is no cause and effect relation between the coincidental seasonals in bid-ask spreads and January returns for NYSE stocks or the data are too "noisy" to reveal any relation.

We provide comprehensive data on the attributes and outcomes of the restructuring process for a sample of 49 financially distressed firms that restructured by means a prepackaged bankruptcy. Our findings complement previous research on out-of-court restructurings and traditional Chapter 11 filings. By most measures, including the time spent in reorganization, the direct fees as a percent of pre-distress assets, the recovery rates by creditors, and the incidence of violation of absolute priority of claimholders, we find that prepacks lie between out-of-court restructurings and traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcies.

Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempts”) from 1990 to 2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers' sensitivity to the firm's stock price reaction at the announcement is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the managers' reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers' and shareholders' interests.