The composite measures of investment performance: the reward-to-variability index, by Sharpe ([29], [30]) and Lintner [23], and the reward-to-volatility index, by Treynor [33], were developed after Markowitz ([24], [25]) and Tobin [32] popularized the mean-variance framework of analyzing the problems of certain investments. Since these are ex ante measures they are not directly applicable to the evaluation of ex post performance. A theoretical basis for doing so has been provided by Jensen ([17], [18]) who also developed another composite performance measure, the predictability index. In practice, these composite measures have been found to have problems. Foremost, they have been observed to exhibit systematic biases. Various causes of the biases have been proposed. These are: the existence of unequal lending and borrowing rates, the failure to consider higher moments of return distributions, and the elusive “true” holding period.

This paper explores the determinants of financial development by focusing on the role played by barriers to the diffusion of financial technology. These barriers are measured using human genetic distance from the technology frontier. The results based on cross-sectional data for 123 countries suggest that genetic distance to the global frontier has an economically and statistically significant effect on financial development, in that countries that are genetically far from the technology leader tend to have lower levels of financial development. Genetic distance is found to have the largest effect, even after controlling for other determinants of financial development established in the literature. These findings indicate that cultural barriers to the diffusion of financial technology across borders impact financial development by influencing the follower countries’ ability to adopt and adapt innovations from the frontier.

We study a known negative signal, the sale of insider shares in an IPO and find that insiders adopt two concealment strategies consistent with wealth-maximizing behavior. First, insiders underreport the number of personally owned shares in the prominent original prospectus and use an obscure amendment to communicate the true higher level of shares to be offered. Second, when insiders increase shares in a later amendment, they tend to either increase secondary shares disproportional to primary share increases, or to reduce primary shares to wholly or partly conceal the increase in secondary shares offered. Insiders confound the negative secondary share signal by simultaneously sending a positive lockup signal.

We examine the impact of familiarity with business segments on CEOs' divestment decisions. We find CEOs are less likely to divest assets from familiar than from non-familiar segments. We attribute this effect to CEOs' comparative information advantage with respect to familiar segments. Consistent with this information advantage, we document that the familiarity effect is particularly strong in R&D intensive industries. We further find the familiarity effect to be most pronounced for longer-tenured CEOs who have built up sufficient political power over the course of several years in office to enable implementation of their preferred divestment choices. We also document the value effects of divestments and show that familiarity affects returns on divestment announcements.

The authors provide evidence that taxes affect equity valuation by studying British investment trusts having otherwise identical classes of cash- and stock-dividend-paying shares outstanding. The authors study 1969-82, a period in which there were two dramatic changes in tax policy. They find that stock-dividend shares, which are convertible into cash-dividend shares, sell at premiums when the tax system favors capital gains and at discounts when the tax advantage of capital gains is reduced. After the 1975 elimination of the tax advantage to stock-dividend shares, the authors observe that investors convert virtually all stock-dividend shares into cash-dividend shares.

James S. Ang, Thomas Schwarz, Risk Aversion and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 825-844

Miller and Scholes (1978) hypothesize that the marginal tax rate on dividend income may be less than the marginal rate of tax on capital gains. Their hypothesis is dependent upon individuals utilizing existing provisions of the Code which serve to reduce the taxation of dividends. In this study, estimates of the marginal and effective rates of tax on dividend income for the year 1979 are presented using the Statistics of Income sample of returns. The average marginal rate of tax on dividend income is estimated to be 40%, while the average effective rate of tax is estimated to be 30%.

ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between return and yield in the context of ex ante data from The Value Line Investment Survey and by examining the role of dividends as a proxy for risk. The use of ex ante data should substantially reduce the confounding of tax and information effects that has affected earlier studies. Heteroscedasticity is detected in the after‐tax CAPM and found to be negatively related to yield and positively related to beta. Maximum likelihood methods are used to correct for heteroscedasticity and generate efficient coefficient estimates. Using data for each of the years 1973 through 1983, there is an overall positive relationship between expected return and yield. However, coefficient estimates of yield are highly variable from year to year.