We develop a general equilibrium model in which firms issue nearly redundant securities to investor clienteles with participation constraints, with prices and demand determined endogenously in primary and secondary markets. The model characterizes how issuance costs, market frictions, and investor composition shape firms’ funding choices, equilibrium prices, and asset allocations. We test the model’s predictions using data from the Malaysian corporate bond market following the introduction of Islamic bonds. Consistent with the model, issuance decisions reflect trade-offs between collateral and liquidity benefits, Islamic and conventional bonds coexist without crowding out, and the expanded investor base increases access to debt financing.

This article empirically tests five structural models of corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). We implement the models using a sample of 182 bond prices from firms with simple capital structures during the period 1986--1997. The conventional wisdom is that structural models do not generate spreads as high as those seen in the bond market, and true to expectations, we find that the predicted spreads in our implementation of the Merton model are too low. However, most of the other structural models predict spreads that are too high on average. Nevertheless, accuracy is a problem, as the newer models tend to severely overstate the credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility and yet suffer from a spread underprediction problem with safer bonds. The Leland and Toft model is an exception in that it overpredicts spreads on most bonds, particularly those with high coupons. More accurate structural models must avoid features that increase the credit risk on the riskier bonds while scarcely affecting the spreads of the safest bonds.

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this “contagion” channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.

We examine the evolution of insider ownership of IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 to understand how U.S. firms become widely held. A majority of these firms has insider ownership below 20% after 10 years. Stock market performance and liquidity play an extremely important role in ownership dynamics. Firms with stocks that are highly valued, are liquid, and have performed well experience large decreases in insider ownership and become widely held. Ownership also falls for low cash flow and high capital expenditures firms. Surprisingly, variables proxying for agency costs have limited success in explaining the evolution of insider ownership.

Corporate bond spreads are affected by both credit risk and liquidity and it is difficult to disentangle the two factors empirically. In this paper we separate out the credit risk component by examining bonds that are issued by the same firm and that trade on the same day, allowing us to examine the effects of liquidity in a sample of bond pairs. We examine standard liquidity measures to determine how well they explain the differences in the two bonds’ yield spreads and find that the proxies do a poor job of measuring liquidity effects. Incorporating liquidity proxies related to other bonds issued by the firm and those for bonds of other firms can significantly improve the explanatory power. Still, a significant portion of the spread is left unexplained and it is largely driven by a common unknown factor. We conclude that good proxies for the liquidity component of corporate bond spreads remain elusive.