We explore the interplay between trade-invoicing patterns and the pricing of safe assets in different currencies. Our theory highlights the following points: (i) a currency’s role as a unit of account for invoicing decisions is complementary to its role as a safe store of value; (ii) this complementarity can lead to the emergence of a single dominant currency in trade invoicing and global banking, even when multiple large candidate countries share similar economic fundamentals; (iii) firms in emerging-market countries endogenously take on currency mismatches by borrowing in the dominant currency; and (iv) the expected return on dominant-currency safe assets is lower than that on similarly safe assets denominated in other currencies, thereby bestowing an “exorbitant privilege” on the dominant currency. The theory thus provides a unified explanation for why a dominant currency is so heavily used in both trade invoicing and in global finance.

We develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and capital structure decisions facing financial institutions. Our model incorporates two key features: (i) value-maximizing banks have a well-founded concern with risk management; and (ii) not all the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market. This approach allows us to show how bank-level risk management considerations should factor into the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. We examine several applications, including: the evaluation of proprietary trading operations, and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. We also compare our approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.

This paper estimates the systematic risk of the debt in public leveraged recapitalizations. We calculate this risk as a function of the difference in systematic equity risk before and after the recapitalization. The increase in equity risk is surprisingly small after a recapitalization, ranging from 37% to 57%, depending on the estimation method. If total company risk is unchanged, the implied systematic risk of the post-recapitalization debt in twelve transactions averages 0.65. Alternatively, if the entire market-adjusted premium in the leveraged recapitalization represents a reduction in fixed costs, the implied systematic risk of this debt averages 0.40.

HD28 .M414 no.2062-88,

[We study the stock price distributions that arise when prices follow a diffusion process with a stochastically varying volatility parameter. We use analytic techniques to derive an explicit closed-form solution for the case where volatility is driven by an arithmetic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (or AR1) process. We then apply our results to two related problems in the finance literature: (i) options pricing in a world of stochastic volatility, and (ii) the relationship between stochastic volatility and the nature of "fat tails" in stock price distributions.]

We study the stock price distributions that arise when prices follow a diffusion process with a stochastically varying volatility parameter. We use analytic techniques to derive an explicit closed-form solution for the case where volatility is driven by an arithmetic Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (or AR1) process. We then apply our results to two related problems in the finance literature: (i) options pricing in a world of stochastic volatility, and (ii) the relationship between stochastic volatility and the nature of “fat tails” in stock price distributions.

We study supply‐and‐demand effects in the U.S. Treasury bill market by comparing the returns on T‐bills to the policy rate on the Federal Reserve's reverse repurchase (RRP) facility. We develop and test a simple model where the RRP‐bill spread is policed both by heterogeneously elastic money funds and by corporate treasurers who derive collateral benefits from holding T‐bills. In response to shifts in T‐bill supply, money funds act as front‐line arbitrageurs. However, when T‐bills become extremely scarce, less elastic corporate treasurers become the marginal investors and supply shifts have a larger effect on T‐bill rates.

We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long‐run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time‐consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.

We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.

We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns--and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment--these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.