Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preceding announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously reported accounting book values. Reported common stock returns associated with alleged misrepresentations in financial statements are consistent with incentives provided by the law. Classification of misrepresentations based on hypothesized relations between announcements and security returns results in observed differences in the association between litigated accounting announcements and common stock returns.

This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting phenomena derive from labor market monopsony. Under monopsony, price is unavailable to clear the market; time of contract becomes the currency for working out market forces. Roth’s matching serves to shore up the monopsony and would be unnecessary if the monopsony were removed; a superior solution is to end the monopsony.

This study examines aspects of pay and promotion in corporate hierarchies in the context of tournament theory. Evidence supports the tournament perspective in that most positions are filled through promotion and pay rises strongly with hierarchical level. Furthermore, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Not all evidence is supportive: the square of the number of competitors is negatively associated with the CEO prize. Additionally, firms do not appear to maintain short-term promotion incentives, as lengthier time in position prior to a promotion reduces the pay increase from the promotion. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.

Risk aversion enters many theoretical models of human capital investment, but attitudes toward risk have not been incorporated in empirical models of human capital investment. This article develops a model of the joint investment in financial wealth and human wealth to show that human capital investment is an inverse function of the degree of relative risk aversion. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that wage growth is positively correlated with preferences for risk taking. More-educated individuals are also more likely to be risk takers, thus risk taking explains a portion of the returns to education.

This paper hypothesizes that the quit propensity of married men rises with an increase in their wives' income. Assuming that individuals are risk averse and that quitting is risky, the wife's income increases the husband's expected value of quitting by reducing the variance of expected family income. Using the longitudinal data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the wife's income is found to have a large effect on quits. The average husband's quit rate increases by about 45% when the wife's income rises from zero to two-thirds that of the husband's. The wife's income effect nearly offsets the negative effect that marriage typically has on male quit rates.

We examine the change in the value of the underlying stock associated with long-term option introduction. Analysis of the abnormal returns associated with LEAPS (Long-Term Equity Anticipation Security) introductions indicates a decline in firm value even after we control for the endogenous nature of the listing decision. However, the evidence does not support previously-offered explanations for the price change associated with option introductions. In particular, we do not find the predicted relations between the cumulative abnormal returns and variables associated with loosening of short sale constraints such as beta, proxies for the dispersion in investor beliefs, and change in relative short interest.

This paper tries to explain why the issuers of an asset would restrict what information is available about their asset. In a world where knowledge is valued, market forces should induce disclosure, but we often see markets (such as the market for mortgage-backed securities) where assets' issuers refuse to release valuable information. We present a model of market liquidity and find that market liquidity can both rise and fall with the quantity of released information. More information may increase asymmetries of information and “lemons” style breakdowns. We find that asset bundling is more advantageous when private information is more accurate, which may be the case in the mortgage-backed securities market.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G32.

We investigate whether uninsured depositors, insured depositors, and general creditors exhibit evidence of quantity market discipline during the recent financial crisis. To establish which types of creditors expect to incur loss, we evaluate the FDIC's expectations about losses to creditors at banks that failed between 2008 and 2010. Our results show that quantity market discipline tends to begin far enough in advance to signal to both banks and supervisors that corrective actions can and should be taken. Furthermore, creditors are able to distinguish between banks of different risk levels. Our findings support several policy implications for encouraging market discipline.

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.