This paper examines testing for AR(1) disturbances against MA(1) disturbances in the linear regression model. A Monte Carlo experiment compares the small-sample properties of the Cox test, some linearized Cox tests, and an approximate point optimal test, as well as a Lagrange multiplier test of AR (1) disturbances against ARM A (1,1) disturbances. The main findings are that the true sizes of the asymptotic non-nested tests can differ considerably from their nominal sizes, the Lagrange multiplier test's sizes are reasonably accurate and the point optimal test is generally more powerful than the other tests when appropriate critical values are used. When sizes are controlled at an arbitrary value of the AR (1) parameter, the relative power of the Cox test is increased substantially.

[This paper examines third-degree price discrimination by an intermediate good monopolist selling to downstream firms that differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input. It is shown that discrimination may lead to all buyers facing higher prices, and conditions under which discrimination reduces welfare by lowering total output are presented. It is shown that discrimination may raise welfare in some cases by preventing socially inefficient backward integration.]

This paper examines empirically the importance of relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities, using data for 277 coal contracts. For each contract, measures of the duration of contractual commitments agreed to by the parties at the contract execution stage and measures of the importance of relationship specific investments are developed. The results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage, and rely less on repeated bargaining, when relationship-specific investments are more important. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

[This paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities. Data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis. The results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage, and rely less on repeated bargaining, when relationship-specific investments are more important.]

This paper argues that the empirical disagreement as to whether capital and energy are complements or substitutes is not likely to be reconciled with aggregate data. It demonstrates that price-induced changes in the composition of output can cause either outcome in the aggregate, even if no technical substitution is possible. Substitution by consumers and changes in the relative incomes of consumers and foreigners are identified as key factors in determining which outcome arises.

In this paper we analyze an aggregative general equilibriiri model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint, applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods. The system is subject to both real and nxnetary shocks, which are economy-wide and observed by all. We develop methods for verifying the existence of, characterizing, and explicitly calculating equilibria. A main result of the analysis is that current money growth affects the current real allocation only insofar as it affects expectations about future money growth, i.e., only through its value as a signal.

We investigate the valuation consequences of voluntary proposals to sell part or all of a corporation's assets. For partial sell-offs, successful sellers and buyers reap statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.66% and 0.83%, respectively. Unsuccessful sellers realize gains at the bid announcement of 1.41% that are lost at the offer termination. In contrast, proposals to liquidate the firm are associated with significant average abnormal returns of 12.24%. We interpret these findings as evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses rather than as evidence of market mispricing before the divestiture announcements.

ABSTRACT An econometric time‐series model of off‐board trading of NYSE‐listed stocks shows that high NYSE commission rates were an incentive for third‐market trading but that trading on the regional exchanges, which is most of the off‐board trading, has been affected very little by commissions or their deregulation. The effects of some changes in the trading organization and rules are estimated, including several that are part of the emerging National Market System. The estimates imply that the NMS has increased competition for the NYSE, as Congress intended, and has prompted the NYSE to improve its performance to retain market share.