The great housing convulsion that buffeted America between 2000 and 2010 has historical precedents, from the frontier land boom of the 1790s to the skyscraper craze of the 1920s. But this time was different. There was far less real uncertainty about fundamental economic and geographic trends, making the convulsion even more puzzling. During historic and recent booms, sensible models could justify high prices on the basis of seemingly reasonable projections about stable or growing prices. The recurring error appears to be a failure to anticipate the impact that elastic supply will eventually have on prices, whether for cotton in Alabama in 1820 or land in Las Vegas in 2006. Buyers don't appear to be irrational but rather cognitively limited investors who work with simple heuristic models, instead of a comprehensive general equilibrium framework. Low interest rates rarely seem to drive price growth; underpriced default options are a more common contributor to high prices. The primary cost of booms has not typically been overbuilding, but rather the financial chaos that accompanies housing downturns.

[We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to report to commercial databases and funds that do not. We find that funds that report their performance to commercial databases significantly outperform nonreporting funds. Our results suggest that the voluntarily reported performance in commercial databases suffers from a selection bias that may exaggerate the average skill of the universe of hedge fund managers.]

We first develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases, as the joint prevalence of large pandemics such as AIDS and malaria increases. We also show that the optimal bank reserves increase as the prevalence increases. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider a large dataset of developing countries, and we exhibit a causality effect from combined prevalence to deposit turnover, as well as causality effect from an increase of combined prevalence to an increase in bank reserves. Those empirical facts therefore support our theoretical findings.

What is the role of leaders in large organizations? We propose a model in which a leader helps to overcome a misalignment of followers' incentives that inhibits coordination, while adapting the organization to a changing environment. Good leadership requires vision and special personality traits such as conviction or resoluteness to enhance the credibility of mission statements and to effectively rally agents around them. Resoluteness allows leaders to overcome a time-consistency problem that arises from the fact that leaders learn about the best course of action for the organization over time. However, resoluteness also inhibits bottom-up information flow from followers. The optimal level of resoluteness depends on followers' signal quality and the corporate culture of the organization.

This study investigates experimentally how mutual monitoring affects effort when employees are compensated via rank‐order tournaments. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that mutual monitoring may either decrease effort by facilitating collusion or increase effort by stimulating competition. In our first experiment, we find that mutual monitoring increases effort, because participants do not attempt to collude but rather behave competitively. This result leads us to expand our theory and develop hypotheses to predict that the effect of mutual monitoring depends on whether employees have the inclination to collude or compete. Specifically, we predict that mutual monitoring decreases effort when employees are inclined to collude and increases effort when employees are inclined to compete; that is, mutual monitoring will not change the basic inclination created by the workplace setting, but will “turn up the volume” on the effect that such inclination has on effort. Consistent with our predictions, our second experiment finds that mutual monitoring leads to lower effort when participants have a collusive inclination and (eventually) higher effort when they have a competitive inclination. Overall, the results from these two experiments suggest that allowing employees to observe each other's productive effort in tournament incentive settings may have positive or negative consequences for the firm, depending on whether environmental factors predispose employees to collude or compete.

In frictionless capital markets with complete information and rational investors, stock prices adjust to new information instantaneously and completely. However, a substantial body of research studies information imperfections such as asymmetric information and incomplete information. Information imperfections potentially hinder timely price discovery and are likely associated with delayed stock price adjustment to information. Our first research question therefore is whether the quality of accounting information (or “accounting quality”) is one such information imperfection that is associated with cross‐sectional variation in stock price delay. We define accounting quality as the precision with which financial reports convey information to equity investors about the firm’s expected cash flows. Poor accounting quality is likely associated with higher expected returns through uncertainty about stock valuation parameters and incomplete information. Our second research question therefore is whether the accounting quality component of price delay is associated with higher future stock returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that poor accounting quality is associated with delayed price adjustment and higher future stock returns. Thus, accounting quality plays a role in timely stock price discovery.