We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.

Proponents of IFRS argue that mandating a uniform set of accounting standards improves financial statement comparability that in turn attracts greater cross-border investment. We test this assertion by examining changes in foreign mutual fund investment in firms following mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union in 2005. We measure improved comparability as a credible increase in uniformity, defined as a large increase in the number of industry peers using the same accounting standards in countries with credible implementation. Consistent with this assertion, we find that foreign mutual fund ownership increases when mandatory IFRS adoption leads to improved comparability.

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms11In this paper “private firms” refers to listed non state-owned-enterprises, the ultimate controlling shareholder of which is an individual. listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.

The revelation of material negative events about a firm, including issues such as fraud, restatements, or internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs), may destabilize the firm’s corporate governance equilibrium as it works to remediate the event or effects thereof. Prior research investigates the association between the revelation of fraud and restatements and both board and management turnover. We extend that research, proposing and testing a conceptual model of the process that firms use to remediate negative events in general and ICMWs specifically, with a focus on the role of governance structure changes. Using a sample of 733 firms revealing an ICMW compared to 3,602 firms with unqualified internal control reports, results reveal a positive association between disclosure of ICMWs and subsequent turnover of members of boards of directors, audit committees, and top management. Focusing on the ICMW sample and comparing the 511 firms that remediate their ICMWs to the 222 firms that do not, results illustrate a positive association between remediation of ICMWs and improvements in the characteristics of boards of directors, audit committees, and top management. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

This study examines the relation between internal controls and conditional conservatism (“conservatism”), also referred to as timely loss recognition. Using a sample of firms that disclose material weaknesses (MWs) in internal controls under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), we find a positive relation between internal control quality and conservatism. Specifically, firms with MWs exhibit lower conservatism than firms without such weaknesses. Further, firms that disclose MWs and subsequently remediate these weaknesses exhibit greater conservatism than firms that continue to have MWs. Overall, these results are consistent with strong internal controls acting as a mechanism that facilitates conservatism. Our study contributes to the literature on the reporting effects of strong versus weak internal controls.

Using a large sample of hedge fund manager characteristics, we provide one of the first comprehensive studies on the impact of manager characteristics, such as education and career concern, on hedge fund performances. We document differential ability among hedge fund managers in either generating risk-adjusted returns or running hedge funds as a business. In particular, we find that managers from higher-SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take fewer risks. Unlike mutual funds, we find a rather symmetric relation between hedge fund flows and past performance, and that hedge fund flows do not have a significant negative impact on future performance.

We examine stock exchange trading rules for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict, across countries and over time, in 42 stock exchanges around the world. Some stock exchanges have extremely detailed rules that explicitly prohibit specific manipulative practices, but others use less precise and broadly framed rules. We create new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict based on the specific provisions in the trading rules of each stock exchange. We show that differences in exchange trading rules, over time and across markets, significantly affect liquidity.

Cross-holdings are created when a shareholder of one firm holds shares in other firms as well, and cross-holdings alter shareholder preferences over corporate decisions that affect those other firms. Prior evidence suggests that such cross-holdings explain the puzzle of why shareholders allow acquisitions that reduce the value of the bidder. Conducting a shareholder-level analysis of cross-holdings, we instead find that cross-holdings are too small to matter in most acquisitions and that bidders do not bid more aggressively even in the few cases in which cross-holdings are large. We conclude that cross-holdings do not explain value-reducing acquisitions. Beyond acquisitions, we find that institutional cross-holdings between large firms have, in fact, increased rapidly over the last 20 years, but mostly due to indexing and quasi-indexing. As in acquisitions, cross-holdings by active investors are typically too small to matter.