We find that financial statement comparability enhances the ability of current period returns to reflect future earnings, as measured by the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). This suggests that comparability improves the informativeness of stock prices and allows investors to better anticipate future firm performance. In addition, using both the FERC and stock price synchronicity tests, we find that comparability increases the amount of firm‐specific information (rather than market/industry‐level information) reflected in stock prices. Analysts play an important role in improving stock price informativeness by producing more firm‐specific information when comparability is high. These findings suggest that comparability lowers the costs of gathering and processing firm‐specific information.

We investigate the relation between audit committee co‐option and financial reporting quality, where audit committee co‐option is measured as the proportion of audit committee members who joined the board after the appointment of the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Because CEOs are often actively involved in the director nomination and selection process, we expect that higher levels of audit committee co‐option will be associated with less effective monitoring, as evidenced by more financial statement misstatements and greater absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive relation between audit committee co‐option and misstatements as well as between audit committee co‐option and absolute discretionary accruals. Our findings should be of interest to regulators, investors, and other stakeholders because we provide new evidence about how potential CEO influence on director nominations and audit committee appointments impacts the effectiveness of monitoring by the audit committee.

We test whether firms that exclude the effects of amortization from non-GAAP earnings allocate more of an acquisition’s purchase price to definite-lived intangible assets (DLIA). This strategy can yield two potential benefits: it can (1) increase non-GAAP earnings by shifting depreciation of tangible assets, which is often included in non-GAAP earnings, to amortization of DLIA, which non-GAAP earnings exclude, and (2) decrease the likelihood of future impairments by shifting allocations from goodwill to DLIA. Consistent with expectations, we find that non-GAAP-reporting firms that exclude amortization from non-GAAP earnings allocate more of the purchase price to DLIA. We also find that these firms allocate less of the purchase price to depreciable assets and goodwill. Finally, we document earnings surprise and valuation benefits related to these allocation choices. Overall, our results provide new evidence about non-GAAP reporting and purchase price allocations and suggest that non-GAAP reporting can influence management’s GAAP accounting choices. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources described in the paper.

We provide evidence that some managers use a multi‐period, coordinated strategy involving inflated current‐period discretionary accruals and optimistic forecasts of future earnings to delay the revelation of bad news. Inflating discretionary accruals increases investor expectations of future performance, and issuing optimistic earnings forecasts of future earnings supports the inflated accruals and extends the horizon for managers to benefit. This strategy is more pronounced for firms that engage in earnings management outside of GAAP, suggesting intentional behavior. Our evidence indicates that managers use this coordinated strategy when firms experience significant bad news and cannot delay revealing all of the bad news through accrual management. We also find that managers use this coordinated strategy when focusing on short‐term performance due to career concerns (i.e., dismissal) or retirement or when they have shorter stock option vesting schedules, which motivates them to inflate investor expectations for shorter‐term personal benefits. Furthermore, managers using this strategy do not hold deep in the money exercisable stock options, which is consistent with managers' private assessment of a higher (lower) likelihood of releasing bad (good) news in the future.

Although the FASB and IASB conceptual frameworks identify relevance and faithful representation as the fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful information, prior research suggests that revenue recognition accounting standards that restrict managerial discretion resulted in improved faithful representation but reduced relevance. We use the adoption of Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2009‐13 and ASU 2009‐14 to examine the effects of increased managerial discretion to accelerate revenue recognition in multiple‐deliverable arrangements; that is, transactions where vendors sell multiple products or services that are delivered at different points in time. We find that increased discretion results in an increase in the relevance of reported revenues without reducing faithful representation. We further examine whether managers' strategic motivations influence the transparency of ASU 2009‐13 and ASU 2009‐14 adoption disclosure. Although firms providing opaque adoption disclosure do not exhibit a decline in the faithful representation of revenues following the standards' adoption, these firms are more likely than firms providing transparent adoption disclosure to accelerate revenue recognition opportunistically following adoption when incentives are high. These results provide important evidence for assessing whether standards that allow greater discretion in revenue recognition affect the usefulness of revenues and also provide evidence that strategic motivations to preserve flexibility in managing earnings influence the transparency of adoption disclosure.

In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.

In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer ( CFO ) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFO s face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.

In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

In this study, we document evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings quality. Our study is motivated by calls for “mandatory auditor rotation,” which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality. Multivariate results, controlling for firm age, size, industry growth, cash flows, auditor type (Big N versus non-Big N), industry, and year, generally suggest higher earnings quality with longer auditor tenure. We interpret our results as suggesting that, in the current environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.