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Increased debt and industry product markets an empirical analysis
This paper tests for changes in firms' production and pricing decisions in four industries in which firms have sharply increased their financial leverage. The analysis of product price and quantity data shows that industry product market decisions are associated with capital structure. In three industries, output is negatively associated with the average industry debt ratio. In the one industry which shows a positive association between output and debt ratios, rival firms have low financial leverage and entry barriers are relatively low. Analysis of executive compensation data supports the hypothesis that managers' incentives to maximize shareholders' wealth increase following recapitalization.
The Mandatory Disclosure of Trades and Market Liquidity
[Financial market regulations require various "insiders" to disclose their trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatory disclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits. This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunities for insiders even if they possess no private information on the asset's value. We also show that insiders will generally not voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure to be forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis is that the market cannot observe whether an insider is trading on private information regarding asset value or is trading for personal portfolio reasons.]
Aggregate Performance Measures in Business Unit Manager Compensation: The Role of Intrafirm Interdependencies
Robert M. Bushman, Raffi J. Indjejikian, Abbie Smith, Aggregate Performance Measures in Business Unit Manager Compensation: The Role of Intrafirm Interdependencies, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 33, Studies on Managerial Accounting (1995), pp. 101-128
Moral Hazard and Management Control in Just-in-Time Settings
Management control, Moral Hazard, Just-in-Time management, Motivation
Aggregate Price Indices, New Goods, and Generics
This paper examines the appropriate treatment in the cost-of-living index of the appearance of new varieties of old goods. Existing theory here applies to individual households. Thus, we first show in what sense Laspeyres and Paasche indices for groups of households can be considered approximations to theoretically desirable group indices and then go on to the case of new goods. We apply our results to the case of the introduction of generics in pharmaceuticals and show that proper treatment can make a considerable difference.
Economic Growth and the Environment
We examine the reduced-form relationship between per capita income and various environmental indicators. Our study covers four types of indicators: urban air pollution, the state of the oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, and contamination of river basins by heavy metals. We find no evidence that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth. Rather, for most indicators, economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement. The turning points for the different pollutants vary, but in most cases they come before a country reaches a per capita income of $8000.
Determinants of conglomerate and predatory acquisitions: evidence from the 1960s
We estimate continuous-time event-history models of the acquisition of conglomerate vs. non-conglomerate and predatory vs. friendly acquisitions among the 1962 Fortune 500 between January, 1963, and December, 1968. Our analysis of predatory acquisitions reveals that there were strong disciplinary motivations for these acquisitions in the 1960s. Q ratios were, by a large margin, the most important determinant of predatory acquisition likelihood. Surprisingly, however, corporate boards appear to have provided little alternative to predatory acquisition as a monitoring mechanism during this period. Friendly acquisitions, on the other hand, were concentrated among firms with low price-earnings ratios and high return on equity, suggestive of the earnings manipulation story often associated with conglomerate acquisitions. Our analysis of conglomerate acquisitions reveals that there were strong disciplinary motivations for conglomerate acquisitions during this period. Conglomerate targets had low Q ratios and were as likely as non-conglomerate targets to be acquired in a predatory fashion. We find no evidence that conglomerate acquisitions were motivated by a desire to improve earnings-per-share numbers, as some have maintained. In addition, regardless of type or tenor, we find managerial ownership, firm size, and industrial organization motivations for acquisition are consistently important determinants of acquisition likelihood.