We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.

This study examines analyst forecast errors within the context of stock recommendations. We predict positive forecast error (i.e., optimism) for buy recommendations and negative forecast error (i.e., pessimism) for sell recommendations. We offer two explanations for this prediction: (1) the unconscious tendency to process information in a manner that supports one’s goal, which we refer to as the “objectivity illusion” hypothesis, and (2) the economic incentive to boost trade, which we refer to as the “trade boosting” hypothesis. The pattern of analyst forecast bias we predict (i.e., optimism for buys and pessimism for sells) is opposite in direction to that predicted by the management relations hypothesis—a commonly cited hypothesis for analyst forecast bias. We find broker‐analyst earnings forecast errors are significantly optimistic for buy recommendations and significantly pessimistic for sell recommendations, consistent with the objectivity illusion and trade boosting hypotheses. Our study indicates that the pattern of results reported in prior research (i.e., increasingly optimistic earnings forecasts as the stock recommendation becomes less favorable) is likely driven by a correlated omitted variable, actual earnings. Results of an analysis to distinguish between trade boosting and objectivity illusion appear more consistent with the objectivity illusion.

We develop an equilibrium model of industrial structure in which the organization of firms is endogenous. Differentiated consumer products can be produced either by vertically integrated firms or by pairs of specialized companies. Production of each variety of consumer good requires a specialized component. Vertically integrated firms can manufacture the components they need, but they face a relatively high cost of governance. Specialized firms can produce at lower cost, but search for partners is costly, and input suppliers face a potential holdup problem. We study the determinants of the equilibrium mode of organization when inputs are fully or partially specialized.

We use new fully functional methods to describe and study the dynamics of the short-term interest rate process in continuous-time. The suggested procedure exploits the spatial properties, embodied in the local time process, of the diffusion of interest, and is robust against deviations from stationarity. Our results indicate that the misspecification of a standard constant elasticity of variance model with linear mean-reverting drift cannot be attributed to the nonlinear behavior of the infinitesimal first moment of the short-term interest rate process at high rates. Rather, it should be attributed to the martingale nature of the process over most of its empirical range (i.e., between 3% and about 15%).

This paper examines how stock options affect the decision to repurchase shares. Firms announce repurchases when executives have large numbers of options outstanding and when employees have large numbers of options currently exercisable. Once the decision to repurchase is made, the amount repurchased is positively related to total options exercisable by all employees but independent of managerial options. These results are consistent with managers repurchasing both to maximize their own wealth and to fund employee stock option exercises. The market appears to recognize this motive, however, and reacts less positively to repurchases announced by firms with high levels of nonmanagerial options.

This article examines whether country-specific or global versions of Fama and French's three-factor model better explain time-series variation in international stock returns. Regressions for portfolios and individual stocks indicate that domestic factor models explain much more time-series variation in returns and generally have lower pricing errors than the world factor model. In addition, decomposing the world factors into domestic and foreign components demonstrates that the addition of foreign factors to domestic models leads to less accurate in-sample and out-of-sample pricing. Practical applications of the three-factor model, such as cost of capital calculations and performance evaluations, are best performed on a country-specific basis.

We use a simulation model for a pharmaceutical R&D program to examine the tradeoff between objectivity and relevance of accounting information under various methods of R&D reporting. A simple capitalization rule, similar to the successful‐efforts method of capitalizing oil and gas exploration costs, provides a stronger relation between accounting information and economic values than immediate expensing of R&D outlays or capitalizing the full cost of outlays. The superior relevance of this “successful‐efforts” method persists even when earnings management is widespread.

There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.

Archival studies report that analysts' annual earnings forecasts are optimistic, particularly for firms reporting recent losses. This study addresses whether forecast optimism is an unintentional consequence of analysts' reactions to the structure of information about managers' future plans. I investigate whether analysts who are forecasting earnings use processes consistent with scenario thinking: envisioning a sequence of events in which proposed actions lead to future outcomes. I study professional sell-side analysts in a 2×2 between-subjects experiment with the structure of information (scenario vs. list) and the sign of prior earnings (loss vs. profit) as independent variables. I find that analysts make more optimistic two-year-ahead earnings forecasts when provided information about a manager's future plans framed as scenarios than when provided the same information framed as lists. I also find that scenario-induced optimism is greater for a firm with prior losses than for a firm with prior profits. The results are consistent with scenario thinking causing analysts to issue optimistic forecasts.