This article studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker’s wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.

Compelling empirical evidence documenting a material effect of corporate taxes on leverage decisions is limited, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for the firm's tax benefit of debt. We examine leverage decisions across taxable and nontaxable real estate firms—firms for which we can measure the relative tax benefit of debt with little error. The tax hypothesis implies that for firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Consistent with this, leverage ratios of taxable real estate firms are higher than their nontaxable counterparts, but the magnitude of this difference is at most one-half of that implied by studies that employ simulated marginal tax rates.

We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is played by a type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of ti. As an application to repeated games, we prove an unrefinable folk theorem: any individually rational and feasible payoff is the unique rationalizable payoff vector for some perturbed type profile. This is true even if perturbed types are restricted to believe that the repeated-game payoff structure and the discount factor are common knowledge.

We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves. In addition, the realized values are also private information. We characterize a class of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure: we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts. Within each sequence, higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision; however, an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time, eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship. Moreover, the menu choices differ by future generosity, with more costly (up front) plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future. Thus, the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods.

[In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. We examine the ban's effect on market quality, shorting activity, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and stock prices. The ban's effects are concentrated in larger stocks; there is little effect on firms in the lower half of the size distribution. Although shorting activity drops by about 77% in large-cap stocks, stock prices appear unaffected by the ban. All but the smallest quartile of firms subject to the ban suffer a severe degradation in market quality.]

We study the impact of two recent regulations that impose restrictions on short selling. First, since October 2007 any investor that short sells a firm’s stock is prohibited from purchasing shares in the firm’s seasoned equity offering (SEO) if the short occurred in the five days prior to the offering (pursuant to an amendment to Rule 105). Previously Rule 105 only disallowed investors from covering a pre-issue short sale with shares purchased in the offering. We hypothesize that the amended rule has the unintended consequence of greater discounting for overnight offers, which are not announced in advance, because the rule excludes some potential buyers and thereby forces underwriters to set lower offer prices to fully distribute the offer. The evidence supports this hypothesis. Second, we examine the impact of the SEC’s 2008 Emergency Order that greatly curtails naked short selling on all stocks under its jurisdiction. We find that the Emergency Order is associated with large increases in discounting for offers announced in advance, suggesting that the removal of naked short sellers is associated with reduced pre-SEO pricing efficiency. Taken together, the results imply that recent restrictions on short selling have significant unintended effects on the capital raising process.

This paper discusses a new approach to controlling for the environment when estimating efficiency. In response to the literature on the international comparison of bank efficiency, we draw the attention to a local dimension of comparison. By introducing geographical weights and estimating local frontiers for each US savings bank in the 2001–09 period, we find that the bank technical performance is higher for most banks in comparison to a fixed-effects approach. This result highlights the importance of taking into account the local environment and constraints while analyzing banks’ performance, so as not to consider the factors that are exogenous to these institutions as inefficiencies. Further analysis could improve the weighs calculation by employing other measures of interconnectedness besides geographical distance.

We use venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) to identify and examine the comparative advantage of inexperienced venture capitalists. We argue that, vis-a-vis more established counterparts, younger venture capital firms have a comparative advantage at producing soft information about relatively opaque start-up companies due to their organizational structure. We then quantify an outcome—IPO initial return—from the matching of venture capitalists and start-up companies that demonstrates how this comparative advantage arises. Our findings thus reveal an important aspect of how inexperienced venture capitalists support start-up companies.