An increasing number of studies depart from the rational expectations assumption to reconcile survey expectations with asset prices. While surveys are helpful to establish a link between subjective beliefs and investment decisions, precise inference about how investors depart from rational expectations can be challenging without relying on strong assumptions. In this article, we provide direct experimental evidence of how systematic distortions in investors’ expectations affect their risk-taking across market cycles. As mechanism, we identify an asymmetry in how individuals update their expectations across boom and bust markets. The documented mechanism is consistent with survey data and provides important implications for recently proposed asset pricing models.

Bank internal ratings of corporate clients are intended to quantify the expected likelihood of future borrower defaults. This paper develops a comprehensive framework for evaluating the quality of standard rating systems. We suggest a number of principles that ought to be met by “good rating practice”. These “generally accepted rating principles” are potentially relevant for the improvement of existing rating systems. They are also relevant for the development of certification standards for internal rating systems, as currently discussed in a consultative paper issued by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, entitled “A new capital adequacy framework”. We would very much appreciate any comments by readers that help to develop these rating standards further.

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.

We document a robust dynamic inconsistency in risky choice. Using a unique brokerage dataset and a series of experiments, we compare people's initial risk-taking plans to their subsequent decisions. Across settings, people accept risk as part of a loss-exit strategy—planning to continue taking risk after gains and stopping after losses. Actual behavior deviates from initial strategies by cutting gains early and chasing losses. More people accept risk when offered a commitment to their initial strategy. Our results help reconcile seemingly contradictory findings on risk-taking in static versus dynamic contexts. We explore implications for theory and welfare.

In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under un-certainty are discussed.