We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.

The authors study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. The authors also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics, such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.

We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.

In the article Theory of Capital Structure, by Milton Harris and Artur Raviv (The Journal of Finance, March 1991, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 297-355) there is an error in Tables IV, V, and VII concerning the description of results reported in Investment-Financing Nexus: Some Empirical Evidence, by Michael Long and Ileen Malitz (Midland Corporate Finance Journal, 1985). While the text of Theory of Capital Structure (p. 334) correctly states that Long and Malitz find a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, in Tables IV, V, and VII, a positive, but insignificant, relationship is incorrectly reported. The authors apologize for this error and thank Professor Michael Long of Rutgers University for bringing it to their attention.

This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax‐based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.

This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.