We study the effect of a country's political freedom status on corporate payouts around the world. In both OLS and two-stage regressions, we find that firms in less free countries pay out more cash, suggesting that low political freedom is associated with a less friendly investment environment. Consistent with this view, we further find that firms reduce payouts when a country's political freedom status improves, while they tend to pay out past excess cash and cut future investment in the face of a deterioration in political freedom. In additional analysis, we also find that firms in less free countries do not pay out cash mainly to ease agency concerns: cash payouts in these countries are more volatile and hence less valuable.

This paper investigates the effects of national culture on bank liquidity creation. Using a sample that covers 66 countries over the 2001–2014 period, we find that individualism is associated with greater bank liquidity creation. This evidence lends more weight to the risk-taking and overconfidence bias explanations. We also find that the effect is stronger for larger banks. Moreover, individualism is associated with more (less) liquidity creation in developed (developing) countries, suggesting that social connections and better access to soft information are relevant explanations in developing countries. Additional analysis suggests that the other cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance are related to lower bank liquidity creation. The results remain robust for a battery of sensitivity checks, and for confronting endogeneity and omitted variables concerns.

We provide the first international evidence on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on dividend policy. Using data from 19 countries, we find that a high level of EPU is positively associated with dividend payout. This evidence is robust to using alternative dividend payout measures, to controlling for other sources of uncertainty, and to addressing endogeneity. We further find that the effect of EPU on dividend policy is moderated by firms' free cash flows and governance quality, and by the quality of country-level indicators of shareholder protection, disclosure, enforcement, and creditor protection. Collectively, our novel evidence suggests that dividends help mitigate agency problems during high-EPU periods.

Using a comprehensive set of firms from 57 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we examine the relation between institutional investor horizons and firm-level credit ratings. Controlling for firm- and country-specific factors, as well as for firm fixed effects, we find that larger long-term (short-term) institutional ownership is associated with higher (lower) credit ratings. This finding is robust to sample composition, alternative estimation methods, and endogeneity concerns. Long-term institutional ownership affects ratings more during times of higher expropriation risk, for firms with weaker internal corporate governance, and for those in countries with lower-quality institutional environments. Additional analysis shows that long-term investors facilitate access to debt markets for firms facing severe agency problems. These findings suggest that, unlike their short-term counterparts, long-term investors improve a firm's credit risk profile through effective monitoring.

We examine the relation between state residual ownership and bank risk-taking for privatized banks from 45 countries. Applying propensity score matching, we find that privatized banks tend to exhibit higher levels of risk-taking post-privatization than their publicly listed non-privatized counterparts. Moreover, partially privatized banks exhibit higher levels of risk-taking than fully privatized banks. We also observe a positive and significant relation between the level of residual state ownership and risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the distorted objectives associated with government control, as suggested by the political benefits of control, and with the soft budget constraint views of state ownership. The distortion can be mitigated by the quality of a country's institutional and regulatory environments. Finally, our results show that the effect of state ownership on risk-taking is more pronounced in countries with a higher dominance of state-owned enterprises, and it was more prevalent during the global financial crisis.

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries.

We introduce this special issue on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) with a focus on how EPU affects allocative efficiency. We observe that EPU affects the market value of firms in about 37% of Fama–French 30 industries, but leads to lower investments in 90% of them. Allocation decisions in a market economy rely on signals from the capital market, which EPU distorts. This may cause increasing conflicts of interest between managers and investors. We highlight key studies in the EPU literature and then describe each paper in this special issue. We also provide suggestions for future research.

Motivated by the recent rise of state capitalism, this paper investigates the effects of government ownership on market valuations across a sample of publicly listed corporations from East Asia. We find strong, robust evidence that government-owned firms exhibit higher market valuation than non-government-owned firms, but the relation is not linear. The benefits of government ownership in terms of value premium extend to closely held firms where the government is a second blockholder. These effects stem from the financing decisions of government-owned firms and from the discount rate of cash flows, and hold prior to and during the recent global financial crisis. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of government ownership on valuation is influenced by financial market development and the quality of institutions and government in place. Collectively, our results imply that government ownership can be valuable.

The debate over how firm stakeholder engagement is tied to preserving shareholder wealth has received growing attention in recent years, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, we examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stock market returns during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced market crash and the post-crash recovery. Using a sample of 1750 U.S. firms and two major sources of CSR ratings, we find no evidence that CSR affected stock returns during the crash period. This result is robust to various sensitivity tests. In additional cross-sectional analysis, we find some supporting evidence, albeit weak, that the relation between CSR and stock returns during the pandemic-related crisis is more positive when CSR is congruent with a firm's institutional environment. We also find that Business Roundtable companies, which committed to protecting stakeholder interests prior to the pandemic, do not outperform during the pandemic crisis. We conclude that pre-crisis CSR is not effective at shielding shareholder wealth from the adverse effects of a crisis, suggesting a potential disconnect between firms' CSR orientation (ratings) and actual actions. Our evidence suggests that investors can distinguish between genuine CSR and firms engaging in cheap talk.

We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board governance in the pre-reform period and those in countries with strong external governance mechanisms. Our findings corroborate the dividend outcome model, which postulates that board reforms strengthen the monitoring role of the board and empower outside shareholders to force management to disgorge dividends.