This paper tests the static tradeoff theory against the pecking order theory. We focus on an important difference in prediction: the static tradeoff theory argues that a firm increases leverage until it reaches its target debt ratio, while the pecking order yields debt issuance until the debt capacity is reached. We find that for our sample of US firms the pecking order theory is a better descriptor of firms’ issue decisions than the static tradeoff theory. In contrast, when we focus on repurchase decisions we find that the static tradeoff theory is a stronger predictor of firms’ capital structure decisions.

__Abstract__ This paper shows the importance of correcting for sample selection when investing in illiquid assets with endogenous trading. Using a large sample of 20,538 paintings that were sold repeatedly at auction between 1972 and 2010, we find that paintings with higher price appreciation are more likely to trade. This strongly biases estimates of returns. The selection-corrected average annual index return is 7 percent, down from 11 percent for traditional uncorrected repeat-sales regressions, and Sharpe Ratios drop from 0.4 to 0.1. From a pure financial perspective, passive index investing in paintings is not a viable investment strategy, once selection bias is accounted for. Our results have important implications for other illiquid asset classes that trade endogenously.

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

How synchronized are short sellers? We examine a unique data set on the distribution of profits across a stock’s short sellers and find evidence of substantial dispersion in the initiation of their positions. Consistent with this dispersion reflecting “synchronization risk,” that is, uncertainty among short sellers about when others will short sell, more dispersed short selling signals i) greater stock overpricing and ii) longer delays in overpricing correction. These effects are prevalent even among stocks facing low short-selling costs or other explicit constraints. Overall, our findings provide novel cross-sectional evidence of synchronization problems among short sellers and their pricing implications.

The effectiveness of any sanction depends on the costs of avoiding its restrictions. We examine whether bearish option strategies were substitutes for short sales during the September 2008 short-sale ban. We find a significant diminution in option volumes and a significant increase in option bid-ask spreads for banned stock relative to unbanned stock during the ban period. Apparent violations of the put-call parity bound became significantly more frequent for banned stocks during the ban period. We conclude that the ban acted as an effective restriction on trading in options.

This paper studies the relation between state visits and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. Based on 1161 state visits and 11,531 cross-border acquisitions, we find that corporations from visiting countries are more likely to acquire corporations in countries hosting the visit. Domestic acquisitions in the host country or M&As with non-visiting countries are not elevated. Evidence from instrumental variable analysis points towards a causal effect of state visits on M&A activity. Further analysis shows that the elevated M&A activity originating from visiting countries can be attributed to business networking and a reduction in investment uncertainty and cultural barriers.

U.S. and Japanese firms dominate global convertible bond issuance. Previous research documents more favorable convertible bond announcement effects in Japan than in the U.S. and other developed countries. Using a global sample of convertible bonds issued from 1982 to 2012, we find that the more favorable announcement effects of Japanese convertibles are driven by their stated uses of proceeds. Japanese convertibles more often include capital expenditure as an intended use, while U.S. firms tend to mention general purposes to motivate their offering. Our findings illustrate the value to firms of being more explicit when disclosing the intended use of proceeds of security offerings.

We analyze call announcement returns taking into account two recent developments in the convertible bond market: the inclusion of dividend protection clauses in convertibles' terms, and the high fraction of convertible issues purchased by hedge funds. Calls of dividend-protected convertible bonds are predictable, yet we still observe a negative stock price reaction that cannot be explained by signaling. Greater hedge fund involvement prior to a call means less short selling in response to the call and we document a reduced price reaction. We conclude that price pressure and not signaling underlies the negative announcement effect of convertible bond calls.

Directors are not one-dimensional. We characterize their skill sets by exploiting Regulation S-K's 2009 requirement that U.S. firms must disclose the experience, qualifications, attributes, or skills that led the nominating committee to choose an individual as a director. We then examine how skills cluster on and across boards. Factor analysis indicates that the main dimension along which boards vary is in the diversity of skills of their directors. We find that firm performance increases when director skill sets exhibit more commonality.

While convertible offerings announced between 1984 and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of −1.69%, convertible announcement effects over the period 2000–2008 are more than twice as negative (−4.59%). We hypothesize that this evolution is attributable to a shift in the convertible bond investor base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds. These funds buy convertibles and short the underlying stocks, causing downward price pressure. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the differences in announcement returns between the Traditional Investor period (1984–1999) and the Arbitrage period (2000–September 2008) disappear when controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling associated with a range of hedging strategies. Post-issuance stock returns are also in line with the arbitrage explanation. Average announcement effects of convertibles issued during the Global Financial Crisis are even more negative (−9.12%), due to a combination of short-selling price pressure and issuer, issue, and macroeconomic characteristics associated with these offerings.