This article develops a model in which patterns in buy and sell volume, order imbalances, and expected price changes arise endogenously. The model covers cases in which the market maker is competitive and is a monopolist. Our results provide an explanation for the existence of patterns in mean returns within the trading day and across trading days.

This article develops a theory in which concentrated-trading patterns arise endogenously as a result of the strategic behavior of liquidity traders and informed traders. Our results provide a partial explanation for some of the recent empirical findings concerning the patterns of volume and price variability in intraday transaction data.

The authors compare two methods for a monopolist to sell information to traders in a financial market. In a direct sale, information buyers observe versions of the seller's signal while in an indirect sale the seller sells shares in a portfolio based on his private information. It is shown that, when traders are identical and pricing is linear, there is a trade-off between optimal surplus extraction that is possible under direct sale and more effective control of the usage of information that is possible under indirect sale. The optimal selling method depends on how much information is revealed by equilibrium prices.

Explores the financial contracts that can be entered into by the entrepreneur and the inside investor that permit optimal continuation and investment decisions. The inside investor is assumed to be a venture capitalist. The unique contract under examination is termed the fixed-fraction contract. It gives the venture capitalist an equity-like position in the firm. In addition to enlisting the funds of a venture capitalist, the entrepreneur can approach outside investors. Outside investors do not have the same information that inside investors do. The model presented consists of a three-period project. The analysis of the entrepreneur-led financing highlights the information asymmetry that exists in this type of relationship in addition to agency problems related to investment decisions. On the other hand, the fixed-fraction contract involving the venture capitalist induces optimal continuation because the venture capitalist owns a fixed fraction of the project for which he or she provides the capital. Since the venture capitalist payoff is independent of the pricing of later-issued securities, or she he has no reason to misprice these securities. While the benefits of the fixed-fraction contract are shown, consideration must be given to the venture capitalist's cost of monitoring the firm. (SRD)

ABSTRACT We derive a role for inside investors, such as venture capitalists, in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem. Absent an inside investor, the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information, and overinvestment may occur. An inside investor, however, always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed‐fraction contract, where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project's payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments. This contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds.

The authors develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents hold the market portfolio of risky assets independent of the specific monitoring technology. Otherwise, distortions in risk sharing may occur and monitoring activities that reduce the expected payoff on the market portfolio may be undertaken. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

ABSTRACT Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect , cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.