The appropriateness of financial reporting rules for derivative securities depends on corporations' reasons for using the instruments. Empirically, little is documented about how the instruments affect firms' risk exposures. This study examines derivatives' roles in firms initiating derivatives use. The results are consistent with firms using derivatives to hedge, and not to increase, entity risk. Firm risk (measured several ways) declines following derivatives use. Realized risk reductions and decisions to initiate derivatives programs vary across firms with the expected benefits from hedging. The findings emphasize the importance of hedge-accounting rules that incorporate the impact of derivatives and hedged items simultaneously.

This paper investigates factors associated with audit firm positions on Auditing Standards Board issues during the three-year period ending during 1984. The major finding is that firms with relatively structured audit technologies tend to favor proposed statements while firms with relatively unstructured technologies do not. Audit firm size is not associated with firm position. Also, Big 8 firms favoring proposed statements have lower staff-to-partner ratios and concentrate less in auditing. The staff-to-partner ratio is negatively associated with technology. The results' implications for auditing profession organization studies and auditing and financial reporting research are investigated.

This study addresses the relationship between the supply of auditing in the public sector and political competition expected in future elections. Empirical tests that use cross-sectional data from state governments reveal positive correlations between state audit budgets and measures of political competition. These results are consistent with an argument that public officials' incentives to supply auditing arise from contracting between the officials and their supporting interests.

Following a report of a possible seasonal in Australian share prices [Praetz (1973)], a study was made of the behaviour of share returns using different data and methodology to that of the original report. The test included forecasts of the seasonal using Box and Jenkins methods. Although the results indicate some evidence of a seasonal, it is shown that this is not prima facie evidence of market inefficiency. It is suggested that a more likely explanation is related to the structure of the economy, e.g., changing opportunity cost of money through the year.

The most recently issued, on-the-run, Treasuries are extremely liquid and frequently trade at a premium in both the cash and repo, or financing, markets. Previous research suggests that both the cash and repo premiums reflect demand from buy-and-hold investors who value the superior liquidity of these securities and are reluctant to lend them in the repo market. We find evidence that premiums in the repo market are also closely related to market participants’ demand to hedge interest rate risk associated with their holdings of fixed income securities.

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.

Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally-reported and subsequently-revised financial variables, we study accounting restatements. Our results indicate the worse a bank's financial condition, the more likely it is for originally-reported data to understate financial losses. Also, we find supervisory exams have an important role in uncovering financial problems and prompting accounting restatements to correct loss underreporting. While revisions are directly related to financial difficulties, exam-based restatements are evident at even the earliest stages of deterioration, indicating substantial accounting misstatements—at both banks and other types of companies—can occur well outside severe business circumstances.

This paper investigates the once and future role of listing fees. We consider the theory of listing fees and why such a pricing structure initially evolved. We show how capital market developments have changed the desirability, and even viability, of this pricing structure. We then analyze the economics of listing fees. While providing revenue to the exchange, listing fees impose large (opportunity) costs, and we analyze this trade-off, presenting evidence from the New York Stock Exchange. We also discuss what types of listing requirements make economics sense for exchanges (or perhaps regulators) to impose on companies. Finally we consider whether listing fees will continue to survive. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G18, K22, K23.

This paper reviews and analyzes the legal and economic aspects of the duty of best execution. Although a well-established principle of securities trading, we show that the dual problems of definition and enforcement make best execution both unwieldy and unworkable as a mandated legal duty. We examine the impact of several market practices on best execution, in particular payment for order flow, preferencing and internalization practices, and price improvement and order execution protocols. We suggest three possible directions for the future rule and interpretation of the duty of best execution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, G18, K22, K23.

This paper analyzes dual trading on futures contracts restricted by Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 552. Using floor trader data, several categories of traders are identified, and differences in strategies and profitability are examined. When unrestricted, dual traders execute most customer orders and few personal trades. The evidence supports the hypothesis that dual traders are superior brokers. However, there is no evidence of informational advantages in dual traders' personal trading. Dual traders are shown to provide liquidity with their personal trades. Finally, Rule 552 does not appear to have increased trading costs.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G12, G13, D82.