We examine whether a firm’s debt maturity structure affects its credit quality. Consistent with theory, we find that firms with greater exposure to rollover risk (measured by the amount of long-term debt payable within a year relative to assets) have lower credit quality; long-term bonds issued by those firms trade at higher yield spreads, indicating that bond market investors are cognizant of rollover risk arising from a firm’s debt maturity structure. These effects are stronger among firms with a speculative-grade rating and declining profitability, and during recessions.

We study the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Our model shows that the relation may be either positive or negative depending on parameter values. Asset liquidity improves stock liquidity more for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets (i.e., firms with less growth opportunities and financially constrained firms). Empirically, we find a positive and economically large relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Consistent with our model, the relation is more positive for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets. Our results also shed light on the value of holding liquid assets.

Using the staggered introduction of fast-track debt recovery courts in India, we estimate the causal effect of a reduction in debt contract enforcement costs on financing and asset maturity. A reduction in enforcement costs is associated with an increase in long-term debt and a decrease in short-term debt and trade credit. The increase in debt maturity is confined to firms that borrow from multiple lenders, have abnormally short debt maturity structures before the reform, and to smaller firms. Firms also reduce the number of banking relationships, and increase the proportion of long-term assets after the reform. Received June 12, 2014; accepted September 17, 2015 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

While standard contract theory suggests that a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effects of sector performance, there is evidence that CEO pay is strongly and positively related to such sector performance. In this article, we offer an explanation. We model a CEO charged with selecting the firm’s strategy that determines the firm’s exposure to sector performance. To incentivize the CEO to choose optimally, pay contracts will be positively and sometimes asymmetrically related to sector performance. Consistent with our predictions, the empirical analysis indicates that the observed sensitivity of pay to sector performance is almost fully confined to multisegment firms and is greater in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to alter sector exposure, for more talented CEOs and for CEOs as compared to their subordinate executives. Our evidence is robust to alternate explanations such as CEO entrenchment.

Using data on over 57,000 low-income tax filers, we estimate the effect of Medicaid access on the propensity of households to save or repay debt from their tax refunds. We instrument for Medicaid access using variation in state eligibility rules. We find substanital heterogeneity across households in the savings response to Medicaid. Households that are not experiencing financial hardship behave in a manner consistent with a precautionary savings model, meaning they save less under Medicaid. In contrast, among households experiencing financial hardship, Medicaid eligibility increases refund savings rates by roughly 5 percentage points or $102. For both sets of households, effects are stronger in states with lower bankruptcy exemption limits—consistent with uninsured, financially constrained households using bankruptcy to manage health expenditure risk. Our results imply that expansions to the social safety net may affect the magnitude of the consumption response to tax rebates.

ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large‐scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.

ABSTRACT We combine state minimum wage changes with individual‐level income and credit data to estimate the effect of wage gains on the debt of low‐wage workers. In the three years following a $0.88 minimum wage increase, low‐wage workers experience a $2,712 income increase and a $856 decrease in debt. The entire decline in debt comes from less student loan borrowing among enrolled college students. Credit constraints, buffer‐stock behavior, and other rational channels cannot explain the reduction in student debt. Our results are consistent with students perceiving a utility cost of borrowing student debt arising from mental accounting.

ABSTRACT We focus on public‐market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision‐making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.

ABSTRACT We analyze an entrepreneur/manager's choice between private and public ownership. The manager needs decision‐making autonomy to optimally manage the firm and thus trades off an endogenized control preference against the higher cost of capital accompanying greater managerial autonomy. Investors need liquid ownership stakes. Public capital markets provide liquidity, but stipulate corporate governance that imposes generic exogenous controls, so the manager may not attain the desired trade‐off between autonomy and the cost of capital. In contrast, private ownership provides the desired trade‐off through precisely calibrated contracting, but creates illiquid ownership. Exploring this tension generates new predictions.

ABSTRACT Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.