Specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. Rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences. Resources are underutilized, factor markets are segmented, production suffers from technological “sclerosis,” job creation and destruction are unbalanced, recessions are excessively sharp, and expansions run into bottlenecks. While, depending on the shock, expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization, recessions should typically be softened. In the long run, institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation. Technology choice will also be affected, with the appropriated factor partially “excluding” the other from production to reduce appropriation.

In this paper we derive a model of aggregate investment that builds from the lumpy microeconomic behavior of firms facing stochastic fixed adjustment costs. Instead of the standard sharp (S,s) bands, firms' adjustment policies take the form of a probability of adjustment (adjustment hazard) that responds smoothly to changes in firms' capacity gap. The model has appealing aggregation properties, and yields nonlinear aggregate time series processes. The passivity of normal times is, occasionally, more than offset by the brisk response to large accumulated shocks. Using within and out-of-sample criteria, we find that the model performs substantially better than the standard linear models of investment for postwar sectoral U.S. manufacturing equipment and structures investment data.

We theoretically investigate the interaction of endogenous risk intolerance and monetary policy following a large recessionary shock. As asset prices dip, risk-tolerant agents’ wealth share declines. This decline reduces the market’s risk tolerance and triggers a downward loop in asset prices and aggregate demand when the interest rate policy is constrained. In this context, large-scale asset purchases are effective because they transfer unwanted risk to the government’s balance sheet. These effects are sizable when the model is calibrated to match the estimates of aggregate asset demand inelasticity. The COVID-19 shock illustrates the environment we seek to capture.

We provide a continuous-time “risk-centric” representation of the New Keynesian model, which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices, financial speculation, and macroeconomic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand. In principle, interest rate policy is highly effective in dealing with shocks to asset valuations. However, in practice monetary policy faces a wide range of constraints. If these constraints are severe, a decline in risky asset valuations generates a demand recession. This reduces earnings and generates a negative feedback loop between asset prices and aggregate demand. In the recession phase, average beliefs matter because they not only affect asset valuations but also determine the strength of the amplification mechanism. In the ex ante boom phase, belief disagreements (or heterogeneous asset valuations) matter because they induce investors to speculate. This speculation exacerbates the crash by reducing high-valuation investors’ wealth when the economy transitions to recession, which depresses (wealth-weighted) average beliefs. Macroprudential policy that restricts speculation in the boom can Pareto improve welfare by increasing asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession.

Central banks (the Fed) and markets (the market) often disagree about the path of interest rates. We develop a model where these different views stem from disagreements between the Fed and the market about future aggregate demand. We then study the implications of these disagreements for monetary policy, the term structure of interest rates, and economic activity. In our model, agents learn from the data but not from each other—they are opinionated. In this context, the market perceives monetary policy “mistakes” and the Fed partially accommodates the market’s view to mitigate the impact of perceived “mistakes” on output and inflation. The Fed plans to implement its own view gradually, as it expects the market to receive more information and move closer to the Fed’s belief. Disagreements about future demand translate into disagreements about future interest rates. Disagreements also provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks: after a surprise policy announcement, the market (partially) learns the Fed’s belief and the extent of future “mistaken” interest rate changes. We categorize these shocks into three groups: Fed belief shocks, market reaction shocks, and tantrum shocks. Tantrum shocks are the most damaging, as they arise when the Fed fails to forecast the forward rates’ reaction. These shocks motivate gradualism and communication policies that reveal the Fed’s belief, not to persuade the market (which is opinionated) but to prevent the market from misinterpreting the Fed’s belief. Finally, we also find that disagreements affect inflation and create a policy trade-off between output and inflation stabilization akin to “cost-push” shocks.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

The United States is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate “bubble” and amplified by the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector. Conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result of mistakes in regulatory policy: an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period of the bubble, and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders. In this paper we argue that, while correct in some dimensions, this story misses two key structural factors behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding lever age. First, over the last decade, the US has experienced large and sustained capital inflows from foreigners seeking US assets to store value (Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas 2008 ). Second, especially after the NASDAQ/tech bubble and bust, excess world savings have looked predominantly for safe debt investments. This should not be surprising because a large amount of the capital flow into the US has been from foreign central banks and governments that are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value (Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgenson 2008). In this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment. The model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current crisis. First, during a period of good shocks— which we interpret as the period up to the end

The last few years have seen a significant re-evaluation of the models used to analyze crises in emerging markets. Recent models typically stress financial constraints or distorted financial incentives. While this certainly represents progress, these models share a weakness with the earlier work: neither is uniquely about emerging markets. Adaptations of the Mundell-Fleming model represent Argentina as a Belgium with larger external shocks. Likewise, emerging market models of financial constraints are adaptations of developed economy ones with tighter financial constraints. In our work, we have advocated a model which distinguishes between the financial constraints affecting borrowing and lending among agents within an emerging economy, and those affecting borrowing from foreign lenders. This 'dual liquidity' model offers a parsimonious description of the behavior of firms, governments, and asset prices during financial crises. It also provides prescriptions for optimal policy responses to these crises.

Recent contribution emphasize that the presence of exchange rate target zones has important effects on the within-band behaviour of exchange rates. We show that the implications of available models are strikingly inconsistent with European Monetary System data, and we propose a model of recurring realignments the predictions of which are consistent with the evidence.

We analyze optimal monetary policy and its implications for asset prices when aggregate demand has inertia. If there is a negative output gap, the central bank optimally overshoots aggregate asset prices (above their steady‐state levels consistent with current potential output). Overshooting leads to a temporary disconnect between the performance of financial markets and the real economy, but accelerates the recovery. When there is a lower bound constraint on the discount rate, good macroeconomic news is better news for asset prices when the output gap is more negative. Finally, we document that during the COVID‐19 recovery, the policy‐induced overshooting was large.