[The audit risk model was used to generate hypotheses concerning the effect that internal control evaluation exerts on audit planning decisions. Specifically, directional predictions concerning the contingent nature of the effects of the susceptibility of accounting processes to error, the strength of the internal control design, and the strength of the related compliance tests were developed. These hypotheses were then compared to the behavior exhibited by a group of experienced auditors who completed a highly realistic series of case studies. The auditors' decisions were consistent with the predictions developed from the audit risk model. In addition, the paper introduces a modification of the standard policy-capturing method that allows the use of complex realistic case materials in a powerful, internally valid experimental design which decreases problems with experimental demand. It also provides initial evidence on experts' perceptions of the effectiveness of different approaches to compliance testing and further evidence on auditor consensus in a more structured audit environment.]

Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to issue earnings forecasts. Using an abstract experiment and a survey of experienced financial managers, we provide evidence that managerial overconfidence may also contribute to this decision. Our experiment shows that participants engage in self‐serving attribution, giving greater weight to internal than external factors as explanations for good performance. This increases confidence in improved future performance, which increases their willingness to issue forecasts. Two facets of the stable individual trait overconfidence, dispositional optimism and miscalibration, also contribute to confidence in improved future performance and willingness to issue forecasts. Consistent with these results, experienced financial manager survey participants believe other managers are likely to overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance, and both overoptimism about firm performance and overconfidence in their ability to predict future firm performance contribute to issuance of earnings forecasts.

Availability of information, Market prices, Information dissemination, Disclosures

This paper reports two experiments in which Big 5 audit managers estimate reported (audited) earnings conditional on analysts' consensus forecast, auditing standards, and auditor discovery of a quantitatively immaterial earnings overstatement. We find that auditors judge overstatement correction less likely if it would cause a missed forecast, even for objectively measured misstatements. This behavior is consistent with SEC Chairman Levitt's concerns about opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts. Also, SAS No. 89's mandated representations and communications do not increase corrections that would cause a missed forecast, indicating that the Auditing Standards Board has limited ability to reduce opportunistic corrections through such regulations.

This paper examines experienced managers' judgments about the effects of market price and accounting profit information on negotiated transfer prices. Conventional economic arguments predict that market price should determine negotiated transfer prices by determining reservation prices for parties with outside options. We found, however, that experienced managers expected the influence of market price to be limited by divisional managers' concern about how their profits compare with each other. While market price did affect managers' reservation-price and transfer-price estimates, its influence was significantly less when market price resulted in a more unequal ("unfair") distribution of profits between divisions. Profit comparisons also affected the judgments that determine the efficiency of the bargaining process. We found that as market price diverged from a price that offered equal profits to both divisions, both variance and bias in managers' price estimates increased, indicating that it would be harder to reach agreement on a transfer price.

Examines the effectiveness of two types of decision aids designed to alleviate the effects of one type of task-knowledge mismatch on auditors' judgments. Organization of audit planning tasks; Content and organization of auditors' knowledge; Specific processing problems caused by mismatch between task organization and knowledge organization.

The ability of Einhorn's [1972] "expert measurement and mechanical combination" to eliminate bias and increase consensus in control reliance decisions was examined. This method uses the human to measure cue values end then combines these component judgments with a mathematical model to form global control reliance decisions. Its aim Is to eliminate error Induced when the human aggregates Information into a global judgment. Two groups of senior auditors evaluated a series of cases by either making global control reliance decisions or making component judgments of the strength of the individual controls end compliance tests. Component judgments of the latter group were combined mechanically into an overall Judgment. The mechanically combined component judgments were, on average, more like those provided by a group of firm experts and ware more consensual than the global judgments. These results are compared to those of prior studies which examined similar aids.

This experiment examines whether there are systematic offsetting differences in the manner in which initial decision makers and reviewers attend to information which ensure that evidence inconsistent with initial judgments is given adequate consideration. Differences in attention are proposed, which result in differential recall of evidence by the initial decision maker and reviewer and thus influence what knowledge initial decision makers and reviewers bring to their discussions and subsequent decisions. The results suggest that the review process can act as an effective control by increasing the chances that the implications of inconsistent evidence are considered.

In this study, we examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) can reduce the effect of independence conflicts on audit firm liability. In two experiments, we manipulate (1) whether procedures are performed by a human auditor or with AI and (2) whether the audit firm was careful in maintaining the appearance of independence from the audit client. Results of both experiments indicate that the use of AI significantly reduces the impact of the appearance of independence conflicts on jurors' judgments of audit firm liability. When concerns relating to the appearance of independence conflicts are present, the use of AI helps maintain the perceived objectivity of the auditor, which results in jurors maintaining higher overall trust in the audit process. Our study contributes to literature on determinants of auditor litigation risk and how technological change that is likely to grow in prominence might affect audit firm liability.