Auditing, Sampling plan, Representative sampling, Preventive Sampling

Journal Article A Maximum Sustainable Growth Rate for British Industrial Outputs Get access T. S. Barker T. S. Barker University of Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 3, July 1971, Pages 369–376, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296389 Published: 01 July 1971

Abstract The article presents information related to the department of accounting in various universities in the U.S. In the University of Arizona, Jim G. Ashburne of the University of Texas at Austin is a visiting professor for the Spring Semester 1971. Edwin A. Bump, who completed doctoral work at the University of Missouri, joined the faculty as an assistant professor in September 1970. Taylor W. Foster, who is completing doctoral work at Pennsylvania State University, will join the faculty as an Assistant Professor in September 1971. At the California State College at Fullerton, new faculty for the academic year 1970-71 include Robert W. Vanasse, professor of accounting, previously on the faculty of Ohio State University; Donald J. Barnett and John F. Williams, assistant professors. Robert A. Meier, Chairman, represented the Department at the Faculty Seminar in Palo Alto sponsored by the California Certified Public Accountants Foundation for Education & Research in August 1970. At the DePaul University, Helene Ramanauskas has taken a leave of absence to study quantitative methods at the University of Georgia.

Abstract Presents news briefs related to accounting education as of October 1971. Retirement of E. Bryan Smyth from the University of New South Wales; List of accounting professors who joined the University of Florida; Appointment of Ralph J. Winston as a University Professor of Accounting at the Governors State University in Illinois.

Abstract The article estimates the economic effect of varying certain information practices in a specific firm under a specific set of circumstances. The major features of the simulated decision context are a large number of decision variables, over twenty that are centrally determined with a global, but imperfect, optimization model, and implemented by a number of semiautonomous individual decision makers. These individual decision makers, in turn, have access to certain local information and can marginally influence implementation of the centrally determined decision variables. While the production aspects of the linear program model focus on determining the optimum mix to produce a specified number of each main product, the marketing aspects focus on how many of each main product should be produced and sold. Implementation effects may be viewed in terms of resultant variations in the parameters in the central linear program model and in the levels of the decision variables that the individuals are instructed to implement. Such variation may be controllable, and may be desirable.

Abstract This article comments on the proposed model by Myron J. Gordon for the transfer price problem using a socialist economy as the locus of inquiry. The problems posed by a bureaucratic organization, the need for some kind of sanctions, and the essentially subjective considerations underlying all pricing models are correctly identified as major obstacles in the way of a system which attempts to replicate a market economy without the constraints imposed by relative freedom of economic action. A fundamental weakness of Gordon's approach, however is its reliance on the neoclassical theory of the firm as an image from which such an investigation can proceed, and this is coupled with a specification that one of the conditions which the transfer price system must satisfy is that the prices approximate the characteristics of perfectly competitive prices, and have similar consequences for the allocation and utilization of resources. The article concludes that neither Gordon's model of the firm in a socialist economy, nor his postulated condition that prices must approximate to those which would obtain in a perfectly competitive market economy are acceptable approaches to the solution of the transfer price problem. The answer to this problem is urgently required in order that we may extend the boundaries of accounting to comprehend areas of economic activity which are, as yet, relatively unstructured. It will not be found, we suspect, to lie in the application of neoclassical price theory to problems which that theory was never intended to handle.

I. Oligopoly, risk, and rates of return, 514.— II. Factor payments and risk aversion, 516.