Abstract ABSTRACT: This article traces references to and illustrations of compound journal entries in accounting or bookkeeping treatises up to Lodovico Flori's Trattato of 1636. It is shown that the practice was referred to, discussed, or illustrated earlier and more frequently than has been supposed.

A recent paper in this REVIEW (LongRasmussen-Haworth, 1977) challenges the view that urban size is a source of income equality. L-R-H develop an econometric model that explains variation in the Gini coefficient of male incomes and family incomes. They conclude that urban size creates a more unequal distribution of urban income (as indicated by a significant negative sign on the SMSA population variable). This paper makes several contributions to our knowledge of urban income distribution. First, unlike previous papers, it develops a theoretical framework for separating the effects of urban size and level of development. Second, it provides a theoretical basis, as well as empirical justification, for the hypothesis that level of development (as measured by urban income level) bears a non-linear relationship to urban income inequality, becoming negative at high levels of income. Third, all authors except L-R-H anticipate to decline while moving up the urban hierarchy (size distribution of cities). This paper makes the point that the urban hierarchyequality hypothesis is partly supported but that the conclusion hinges on the choice of measure. Fourth, virtually all previous research on urban income distribution uses the Gini coefficient as the measure of income inequality. This paper uses three measures to test the sensitivity of conclusions to the choice of measure: the Gini coefficient, the incidence of poverty, and the percentile index. Despite the widespread belief by most economists that efficiency and equity do not go hand-in-hand, the urban size-equality view suggests there is no trade-off between the two. Richardson, for example (1973, p. 53), argues that inequality decreases as we move up the urban hierarchy.1 Most of the empirical work on state, county, and urban income distribution supports this view (Mattila and Thompson, 1968; Hoch, 1972; Farbman, 1974; Aigner and Heins, 1967; AlSumarrie and Miller, 1967; Conlisk, 1967; Murray, 1969; Frech and Burns, 1971; Burns, 1975; Danziger, 1975). Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, consistently declines with income level of the state, metropolitan area, or county. The incidence of poverty also appears to decline with urban income level (Omrati, 1968; Richardson, 1973). However, only three studies include both population and income level in their testing (Burns, 1975; Danziger, 1975; and Long-Rasmussen-Haworth, 1977), and only the L-R-H research finds both population and income to be significant variables. Both the theoretical argument and the empirical evidence presented in this paper point to the existence of an efficiency-equity trade-off. Previous research on urban income distribution seems to miss the trade-off because the various issues involved have not been clearly separated. Thus, several basic questions surrounding urban income distribution are investigated in this paper: 1. Does urban size, as measured by SMSA population, have a separate effect from level of development? A theoretical basis for a separate inequality-creating effect of urban size is an expected productivity-agglomeration effect which increases the productivity of skilled labor more rapidly than the productivity of unskilled labor. 2. Can we expect level of development, as measured by urban income level, to have a consistent equalizing effect on urban income distribution? A theoretical argument based on an expected amenity-compensation effect leads us

l'Evolution de Coefficients Input-Output, Economic Applique 16 (1) (1963). Parikh, Ashok, and R. Edwards, Estimation of Gross Domestic Output and Employment by Sectors through Input-Output SSRC Report, unpublished, 1975. Theil, Henri, Applied Economic Forecasting (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966). Theil, Henri, and C. B. Tilanus, Demand for Production Factors and the Price Sensitivity of Input-Output Predictions, International Economic Review 5 (1964), 258-272. Tilanus, C. B., Input-Output Experiments, The Netherlands, 1918-61 (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1966). United Nations, Input-Output Tables and Analysis, Studies in Methods, series F, no. 14, rev. o (New York: United Nations, 1973).

In this paper I provide some new empirical evidence on the impact of tax deductibility on the level of personal charitable contributions. In order to provide empirical evidence of this kind we have to consider the broader question of the determination of the level of charitable giving by the household. The price of which is dependent upon the tax treatment of those contributions, is only one element of this process. Efforts to quantify the impact of tax deductibility lead to an empirical model which allows us to test a number of hypotheses on the determination of the level of charitable contributions. In Section I, a model of personal charitable giving and its empirical implications are discussed. In Section 1I previous attempts to test some of these implications and to quantify the impact of tax deductibility on charitable giving are discussed. Section III presents the specification of the empirical model including a discussion of the data, and Section IV presents empirical results. In Section V the implications of these results are summarized.

The cartelization of world commodity markets is not a new phenomenon. In a historical survey of the experience of some international commodity cartels, Paul L. Eckbo shows that at one time or another there has been an attempt to cartelize the market for most of the major internationally traded commodities. The large majority of these attempts at cartelization, however, were failures-the cartel either dissolved after a short period of time, or in some cases the cartel remained in force officially, but had little or no real impact on price and member revenues. Of the fifty-one formal cartel organizations documented by Eckbo, only nineteen could be considered successful in the sense of being able to maintain a price significantly higher than what it would have been in the absence of agreements. But even the successful cartels were limited in their durability; the average lifetime of the formal agreements was about five years, and only five of the nineteen cartels lasted ten years or longer. What is new is the growing concern that the prospects for successful cartelization have suddenly become greater, and that in the future, world commodity markets are likely to be increasingly dominated by cartels. Much of this concern, of course, has been the result of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) spectacular success in quadrupling world oil prices, and the International Bauxite Association's (IBA) success in tripling the price of bauxite. Warranted or not, this concern now casts a shadow over predictions, policy prescriptions, and proposals for the international management of commodity markets. Buffer stocks and other instruments for price stabilization, for example, become the vehicles for cartelization and the establishment and maintenance of the monopoly price. And for some, cartelization, or more specifically, an implicit or explicit transfer of monopoly and monopsony power from developed to developing countries, is an essential and justifiable component of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). ' Given the historical success record of international cartels, is there any reason to expect new attempts at cartelization to succeed where similar attempts in the past have failed? Has the structure of world commodity markets-or the environment surrounding them-changed in such a way as to better facilitate the formation and success of cartels, so that over the next decade we are likely to witness a proliferation of international cartels that will succeed in raising the prices of a large number of key commodities? There are no simple answers to these questions. While the interest in cartelization on the part of some LDCs may indeed be greater, there appears to be no clear change in the structure of commodity markets that would facilitate their cartelization. It is difficult to agree with C. Fred Bergsten's assertion, for example, that the environment has shifted to one in which supplies of raw material commodities are shrinking as demand keeps growing, thereby encouraging cartelization. In the past some cartels succeeded while others failed for reasons specific to each market and to each cartel configuration. As a more recent example, IBA succeeded while CIPEC, the copper cartel, did not-and