This paper is concerned with the problem of testing the hypothesis that the disturbances of a regression model are generated by a first-order autoregressive process against the alternative assumption that they follow a first-order moving average scheme. The test proposed has the advantages of requiring only ordinary least squares estimation and of being simple to implement. Some Monte Carlo results on the finite sample behaviour of the test are provided.

This paper develops an asymptotic theory for residual based tests for cointegration. Attention is given to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Z(subscript alpha) and Z(subscript t) unit root tests. Two new tests are also introduced. The tests are shown to be asymptotically similar, and simple representations of their limiting distributions are given and asymptotic critical values are tabulated. The ADF and Z(subscript t) tests are asymptotically equivalent. Power properties of the test are also studied. The tests are consistent if suitably constructed, but the ADF and Z(subscript t) tests have slower rates of divergence under cointegration than the other tests. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

Abstract Examines negotiated transfer-pricing outcomes between a buying and selling division by using a bilateral bargaining methodology. Motivation and hypotheses; Manipulation checks and subject cavariates; Implications for research.

[We test whether banks' investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense. We also document an association between banks' marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles. However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We posit specific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning, and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax-planning benefits.]

In an adverse selection model of a securities market with one informed trader and several liquidity traders, we study the implications of the assumption that the informed trader has more information on Monday than on other days. We examine the interday variations in volume, variance, and adverse selection costs, and find that on monday the trading costs and the variance of price changes are highest, and the volume is lower than on Tuesday. These effects are stronger for firms with better public reporting and for firms with more discretionary liquidity trading.

We test whether banks’ investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense. We also document an association between banks’ marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles. However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We posit specific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning, and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax-planning benefits.

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether futures market data can be used to understand the behavior of real interest rates. Several ways of examining the data indicate that futures market data are not particularly informative about real interest rates. Not only does this evidence cast some doubt on results in previous research that make use of futures market data to draw inferences about real interest rates, but it also indicates that future research on real interest rates may need to turn to a different line of attack.