Scott W. Barnhart, Robert McNown, Myles S. Wallace, Non-Informative Tests of the Unbiased Forward Exchange Rate, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 265-291

[In dealership markets disclosure of size and price details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyze a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a public trade and then offsets her position by trading with other market makers. We distinguish between quantity risk and price revision risk. We show that if the market maker learns some information about the motive behind public trade, neither regime is unambiguously welfare superior. This is because greater transparency improves quantity risk sharing but worsens price revision risk sharing.]

The soft budget constraint is a syndrome that was identified and studied by Janos Kornai in his analysis of centrally planned economies ( see, Kornai, 1980 ) . The syndrome is said to arise when a seemingly unprofitable enterprise is bailed out by the government or the enterprise’s creditors. In other words, the enterprise is not held to a fixed budget, but finds its budget constraint ‘‘softened’’ by the infusion of additional credit when it is on the verge of failure. Kornai viewed the soft budget constraint as a crucial ingredient for explaining the salient features of socialist economic performance, in particular, the pervasiveness of shortages. One interesting puzzle is why centrally planned economies have been particularly susceptible to the influence of the soft budget constraint; the capitalist world is hardly immune, as the recent financial crisis in Asia attests, but on the whole it has proved less vulnerable. Indeed, the very origin of the soft budget constraint and the mechanism by which it gives rise to shortages and other undesirable effects are also obviously important questions. Although Kornai’s work has long been well known and appreciated, answers to these associated theoretical questions have been hazarded only recently. In Maskin ( 1996 ) , I surveyed some of the initial efforts in this direction, including Mathias Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which argues that centralization of credit can give rise to soft budget constraints because it facilitates the refinancing of

A central implication of the life-cycle (or permanent-income) theory is that consumption should not respond to predictable fluctuations in income. Tests of this implication have yielded mixed results, especially on micro data (Angus Deaton, 1992; Martin Browning and Annamaria Lusardi, 1996). In large part this might be due to the difficulties of isolating the predictable component of income at the micro level. Most tests proceed by instrumenting for income, but since the available instruments are typically poor, such tests might be prejudiced against finding significant excess sensitivity of consumption to income (John Shea, 1995).' Also, it is not clear how closely the resulting econometric predictions of income coincide with agents' actual expectations of income. To avoid these difficulties this paper examines the response of household consumption to a particular type of income that is both predictable and transitory-income tax refunds. Since a refund depends on events in the previous calendar year, it is predictable income as regards consumption in the year of its receipt. Consequently, under the life-cycle theory consumption should not increase on receipt of a refund.2 In addition to testing the canonical model of consumption, this paper provides estimates interpretable as the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of refunds. Since federal tax refunds now amount to over $80 billion per year (averaging well over $1,000 per refund), these estimates are of interest in themselves. More generally they bear on the impact of even preannounced and temporary changes in fiscal policy. The paper begins by surveying related studies in Section I. Section II describes the data, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which of the leading U.S. micro data sets has the most comprehensive coverage of expenditure. The empirical specification is set out in Section HI. Section IV reports the results, and Section V concludes.

We are in the midst of a structural boom the force of which has not been seen in this country since the 1920’s. After the U.S. unemployment rate hit 6 percent in late 1994, following its two-year recovery, many experts assumed that unemployment had regained its naturalrate path. The natural unemployment rate in the second half of the 1980’s had been put at around 6.5 percent in several estimates, and if the trend reduction in the natural rate brought about by the continuing relative decline of high-school dropouts in the labor force and those whose education stopped at the diploma is placed at 0.07 per annum, it would have declined on that account to around 6 percent by 1995 (Phelps and Gylfi Zoega, 1997). Furthermore, we saw in 1995 the end of

Abstract This study investigates the extent to which property‐casualty insurers select levels of loss reserves, net capital gains, and net stock transactions to meet solvency and tax reporting goals. Insurer solvency is reflected in financial measures known as IRIS (Insurance Regulatory Information System) ratios. IRIS ratios are generally enhanced by underestimating loss reserves, accelerating the realization of capital gains, postponing the realization of capital losses, issuing stock, and cutting dividends. Taxable income is reduced by reporting higher reserves and lower net capital gains on investments. We use simultaneous equations to model the three discretionary choices individually, while controlling for potential tradeoffs among the decisions. During the sample period of the study (1990‐95), there is a shift in the regulatory environment that we argue tends to reduce incentives to meet IRIS goals. Specifically, risk‐based capital (RBC) requirements were adopted in 1994. Although IRIS ratios continued to be used for solvency screening, their effect is expected to be diluted in the post‐RBC period. Our results provide qualified support for this claim. Evidence of the phenomenon is stronger when the choice variables are net capital gains and stock transactions, and weaker when loss reserves are considered. Two of the three discretionary choices affect taxable income: loss reserves and capital gains. We find that tax incentives are significantly associated with the loss reserve estimate throughout the sample period. In contrast, our results are only weakly consistent with the view that capital gains are timed to achieve tax relief.

The magnitude of growth in “underlying” wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s is obscured by a concurrent decline in the federal minimum wage, which itself could cause an increase in observed wage inequality. This study uses regional variation in the relative level of the federal minimum wage to separately identify the impact of the minimum wage from nationwide growth in “latent” wage dispersion during the 1980s. The analysis suggests that the minimum wage can account for much of the rise in dispersion in the lower tail of the wage distribution, particularly for women.

Do professional forecasters provide their true unbiased estimates, or do they behave strategically? In our model, forecasters have common information, confer actively, and thus know the true pdf of future outcomes. Intensive users of economic forecasts monitor forecasters' performance closely; occasional users are drawn to the forecaster who fared best in the previous period. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, even though economists have identical expectations, they make a range of projections that mimics the true probability distribution of the forecast variable. Those whose wages depend most on publicity produce forecasts that differ most from the consensus. Empirical evidence supports the model.

Among U. S. industries where earnings rose relatively from 1979–1995, injury rates declined relatively. Obversely, during the 1960s narrowing interindustry wage differentials were associated with an increase in the relative risk of injury in high-wage industries. Evidence from the NLSY suggests similar results among full-time workers between 1988 and 1996. Between 1973 and 1991 the disamenity of evening/night work was increasingly borne by low-wage male workers. Changing earnings inequality has understated changing inequality in the returns to work. Assuming skill-neutral changes in the cost of reducing these disamenities, estimates of the implied income elasticities of demand for amenities are well above unity.