Using earnings announcement events made by firms belonging to Korean chaebols, we examine propping within a chaebol. Consistent with the market's ex ante valuation of intragroup propping, we find that the announcement of increased (decreased) earnings by a chaebol-affiliated firm has a positive (negative) effect on the market value of other nonannouncing affiliates. The sensitivity of the change in the market value of nonannouncing affiliates to abnormal returns for the announcing firms is higher if the cash flow right of the announcing firm's controlling shareholder is higher. The sensitivity is also higher if the announcing firm is larger, performs well, and has a higher debt guarantee ratio.

Using data from Ontario hospitals, we investigate the conjecture that the stickiness of costs would be greater for functions that relate to an organization's core competency. We find operating costs for the hospital as a whole are sticky. Moreover, we find higher stickiness in costs pertaining to patient care relative to costs in other functions. Indeed, there is no evidence of stickiness in the operating costs of support departments that are peripherally related to the hospital's mission.

Abstract In this paper we present a new method of approximating the risk neutral density (RND) from option prices based on the C-type Gram-Charlier series expansion (GCSE) of a probability density function. The exponential form of this type of GCSE guarantees that it will always give positive values of the risk neutral probabilities, and it can allow for stronger deviations from normality, which are two drawbacks of the A-type GCSE used in practice. To evaluate the performance of the suggested expansion of the RND, the paper presents simulation and empirical evidence.

The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of economic theory. Much theoretical work, of course, focuses on existing economic institutions. The theorist wants to explain or forecast the economic or social outcomes that these institutions generate. But in mechanism design theory the direction of inquiry is reversed. We begin by identifying our desired outcome or social goal. We then ask whether or not an appropriate institution (mechanism) could be designed to attain that goal. If the answer is yes, then we want to know what form that mechanism might take. In this paper, I offer a brief introduction to the part of mechanism design called implementation theory, which, given a social goal, characterizes when we can design a mechanism whose predicted outcomes (i.e., the set of equilibrium outcomes) coincide with the desirable outcomes, according to that goal. I try to keep technicalities to a minimum, and usually confine them to footnotes.

I develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level, and I apply this model to data on the labor supply of New York City taxi drivers. I find that there may be a reference level of income on a given day that affects labor supply. However, there is substantial day-to-day variation in a given driver's reference level, and most shifts end before reaching the reference income level. This pattern is inconsistent with an important role for reference-dependent preferences. (JEL J22, L92)

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.

This paper presents a new pattern in the cross-section of expected stock returns. Stocks tend to have relatively high (or low) returns every year in the same calendar month. We recognize the annual cross-sectional autocorrelation pattern documented in Jegadeesh [1990. Evidence of predictable behavior of security returns. Journal of Finance 45, 881–898] at lags of 12, 24, and 36 months as part of a general pattern that lasts up to 20 annual lags, superimposed on the general momentum/reversal patterns. This pattern explains an economically and statistically significant magnitude of the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. Volume and volatility exhibit similar seasonal patterns but they do not explain the seasonality in returns. The pattern is independent of size, industry, earnings announcements, dividends, and fiscal year. The results are consistent with the existence of a persistent seasonal effect in stock returns.

Structural models of credit risk provide poor predictions of bond prices. We show that, despite this, they provide quite accurate predictions of the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to changes in the value of equity (hedge ratios). This is important since it suggests that the poor performance of structural models may have more to do with the influence of non-credit factors rather than their failure to capture the credit exposure of corporate debt. The main result of this paper is that even the simplest of the structural models [Merton, R., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470] produces hedge ratios that are not rejected in time-series tests. However, we find that the Merton model (with or without stochastic interest rates) does not capture the interest rate sensitivity of corporate debt, which is substantially lower than would be expected from conventional duration measures. The paper also shows that corporate bond prices are related to a number of market-wide factors such as the Fama-French SMB (small minus big) factor in a way that is not predicted by structural models.

We analyze event abnormal returns when returns predict events. In fixed samples, we show that the expected abnormal return is negative and becomes more negative as the holding period increases. Asymptotically, abnormal returns converge to zero provided that the process of the number of events is stationary. Nonstationarity in the process of the number of events is needed to generate a large negative bias. We present theory and simulations for the specific case of a lognormal model to characterize the magnitude of the small-sample bias. We illustrate the theory by analyzing long-term returns after initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

The article discusses the study of determining whether audit risk model is descriptive of what occurs in the auditing practice or if the relationship between fees and internal control deficiencies (ICDs) suggest that audit enterprises exert more effort in auditing firms that impart ICDs. The study examines the internal controls over financial reporting (ICOFR), generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), audit risk model, audit fees and sections of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The study found out that audit fees are significantly higher for firms disclosing material weakness.