We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the latitude allowed by accounting rules. We argue that this interpretation may be premature because, if such association is indeed evidence of opportunism, we ought to observe subsequent poor performance, ceteris paribus. Following Core et al. (1999) we conduct our analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we extend the prior literature and again find a link between poor governance and managers' accounting discretion. However, in the second stage we fail to detect a negative association between accounting discretion attributable to poor governance and subsequent firm performance. This suggests that, on average, managers do not abuse accounting discretion at the expense of firms' shareholders. Rather, we find some evidence that discretion due to poor governance is positively associated with future operating cash flows, which suggests that shareholders may benefit from earnings management, perhaps because it signals future performance.

We investigate the consequences of the “revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement division. If future job opportunities motivate SEC lawyers to develop and/or showcase their enforcement expertise, then the revolving door phenomenon will promote more aggressive regulatory activity (the “human capital” hypothesis). In contrast, SEC lawyers can relax enforcement efforts in order to develop networking skills and/or curry favor with prospective employers at private law firms (the “rent seeking” hypothesis”). We collect data on the career paths of 336 SEC lawyers that span 284 SEC civil cases against accounting misrepresentation over the period 1990–2007. Our overall evidence is consistent with the “human capital” hypothesis. However, we find some evidence of “rent seeking” when SEC lawyers are based in Washington DC and when defense firms employ more former SEC lawyers. The revolving door likely impacts numerous aspects of SEC regulation setting and enforcement. This study examines accounting-related civil cases and is not able to study administrative or non-accounting enforcement cases. Further, the study does not address the choice of which cases to pursue, the incentives of employees other than trial lawyers, or how the revolving door affects rule making. Subject to these caveats, our study provides an important first look into the effects of revolving door incentives on the SEC’s enforcement process and lays the groundwork for future research.

We investigate a prominent allegation in congressional hearings that Moody׳s loosened its rating standards to chase revenue after it went public in 2000. Consistent with this allegation, Moody׳s ratings for both corporate bonds and structured finance products are significantly more favorable to issuers, relative to S&P׳s, after Moody׳s IPO. Moreover, Moody׳s ratings are more favorable for clients subject to greater conflict of interest. There is little evidence that Moody׳s higher ratings, post-IPO, are more informative, measured as expected default frequencies (EDFs) or as the probability of default. Our findings inform the debate on whether financial gatekeepers should be publicly traded.

The financial press and accounting regulators (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board) have expressed concern about pressures on Internet firms to report high levels of revenue. This study verifies the association between market capitalization and revenue, and examines economic factors that potentially influence Internet company managers' decisions to adopt allegedly aggressive revenue‐recognition policies. Specifically, we examine factors hypothesized to influence the reporting of advertising barter revenue and grossed‐up sales levels. We begin by providing descriptive evidence on the use of barter and grossed‐up revenue across Internet sectors. Although common in some sectors, we find that the use of these accounting policies is not pervasive overall. We limit our empirical analyses to Internet companies that have the opportunity to report grossed‐up or advertising barter revenue. Our cross‐sectional predictions are based on both external and internal incentives to maximize revenues as well as constraints that may limit management's discretion. We predict that the following factors increase the likelihood that a firm will report grossed‐up and/or barter revenue: shorter time before needing additional external financing, more active individual investor interest in the firm's stock, more active pursuit of growth via acquisitions, and greater use of stock options in employee compensation. We also posit that barter transactions might be an inexpensive way for firms to evaluate the viability of future marketing or content alliances with potential partners. Finally, we predict that constraints on management discretion are related to the reputation/quality of the firm's auditor and underwriter and the extent of management ownership. We find that firms with greater cash burn rates and higher levels of activity on Motley Fool message boards are consistently associated with barter and grossed‐up revenue reporting.

This paper addresses regulatory concerns that large shareholders of credit rating agencies can influence the rating process. Unlike Standard & Poor's, which is a privately held division of McGraw-Hill, Moody's is a public company listed on the NYSE. From 2001 to 2010, Moody's has two shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway and Davis Selected Advisors, which collectively own about 23.5% of Moody's. Moody's ratings on bonds issued by important investee firms of these two stable large shareholders are more favorable relative to S&P, as well as Fitch, ratings. We exploit Moody's initial public offering in 2000 to address endogeneity and to mitigate concerns that the results are driven by issuer characteristics or by the greater informativeness of Moody's ratings. S&P's parent, McGraw-Hill, has a large shareholder for much less time, and some weak evidence exists that S&P ratings are relatively more favorable toward the owners of McGraw-Hill. These findings are consistent with regulatory concerns about the ownership and governance of rating agencies, especially those that are publicly listed.

Despite regulators’ allegations that digital technology giants misuse their market power to earn abnormal profits, there is a dearth of systematic work on (1) whether digital-tech firms in general, and tech giants in particular, earn excess profits or (2) whether their abnormal profitability, if any, is due to market power. We use two alternative measures of economic profitability in addition to accounting rate of return (ARR): internal rate of return (IRR), which equates current investments to their long-term payback, and return on invested capital (ROIC), whose numerator (profits) and denominator (invested capital) are adjusted for capitalized intangibles. Inferences based on IRRs differ from those based on ARRs and ROICs. IRRs show that the digital-tech sector is now the best-performing sector, and its gap between profitability and cost of capital has increased over time. We are unable to separate the contribution of market power and innovation to digital tech’s high IRRs.

We examine contagion in earnings management using 2,376 restatements announced during the years 1997–2008. Controlling for industry and firm characteristics, firms are more likely to begin managing earnings after the public announcement of a restatement by another firm in their industry or neighborhood. Such contagion is absent when the restating firm is disciplined by the SEC or class action lawsuits, suggesting deterrent effects of enforcement activity. Contagion among peers is observed (1) in the same account as the one restated by the target firm, or (2) when larger target firms restate or the restatement is prominently disclosed, or (3) when the target firm's restatement is less severe. Contagion stops during the years 2003–2005, possibly due to the enforcement associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), but reappears during 2006–2008, perhaps because the sting associated with SOX has worn off. In sum, peers' actions appear to affect a firm's earnings management decisions.

A growing literature investigates the association between stock return variation and several aspects of information and governance structures, in both a cross-country setting and a cross-firm setting within the U.S. Papers use either idiosyncratic stock return volatility or R2 as interchangeable measures of firm-specific return variation but report inconsistent results. An important reason for the differing interpretations is the assumption about whether lower R2 (or higher ) captures firm-specific news or noise. We document that higher (or equivalently, lower R2) resembles noise. In addition, we show, analytically and empirically, that different results obtain when using R2 or because the systematic risk inherent in the R2 metric is also correlated with the independent variable of interest. Therefore, we recommend that when assessing the association between R2 (or ) and some independent variable, researchers (1) control for elements of systematic risk and (2) triangulate their findings with other measures of information environment. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from commercial providers, e.g., WRDS, Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S.

We consider stock markets in 20 countries to investigate whether the accrual anomaly (Sloan 1996), characterized by U.S. stock prices overweighting the role of accrual persistence, is a local manifestation of a global phenomenon.We explore whether the occurrence of the anomaly is related to country differences in accounting and institutional structures, and examine alternative explanations for its occurrence. We find stock prices overweight accruals in general, with accruals overweighting occurring in countries with a common law relative to a code law tradition. Using firmlevel data on a country-by-country basis, we document the occurrence of the anomaly in four countries, Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., and also in a sample of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) of firms domiciled in countries where we do not detect the anomaly. Using country-level data, we confirm the anomaly is more likely to occur in countries having a common law tradition, and also in countries allowing extensive use of accrual accounting and having a lower concentration of share ownership. Additional analyses reveal that earnings management and barriers to arbitrage best explain the anomaly.