[Recent evidence suggests that past mutual fund performance predicts future performance. We analyze the relationship between volatility and returns in a sample that is truncated by survivorship and show that this relationship gives rise to the appearance of predictability. We present some numerical examples to show that this effect can be strong enough to account for the strength of the evidence favoring return predictability.]

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Cross-sectional and time-series tests show that information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. Firms initiating a policy of regularly holding conference calls experience statistically and economically significant and sustained reductions in information asymmetry, in contrast to one-time callers, who experience no significant decline in asymmetry. Since prior work shows that the cost of equity capital is increasing in the level of information asymmetry, our results suggest that firms that hold conference calls more frequently have lower costs of capital.

We propose a new approach to estimating and testing asset pricing models in the context of a bilinear paradigm introduced by Kruskal 18. This approach is both simple and at the same time quite general. As an illustration we apply it to the special case of the arbitrage pricing model where the number of factors is pre-specified. The data appear to be generally in conflict with a five or seven factor representation of the model used by Roll and Ross 30. When we consider the number of replications of our test and the large number of observations on which it is performed, the frequency with which we reject the three factor APM does not lead us to conclude that this model is unrepresentative of security returns. Further, the rejection of the five and seven factor versions is to be expected if the three factor version is correct. The paradigm gives insight into the appropriate specification of the model and suggests that there may be a small number of economy wide factors that affect security returns.

This paper estimates hedge fund and mutual fund exposure to newly proposed measures of macroeconomic risk that are interpreted as measures of economic uncertainty. We find that the resulting uncertainty betas explain a significant proportion of the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. However, the same is not true for mutual funds, for which there is no significant relationship. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, the positive relation between uncertainty betas and future hedge fund returns remains economically and statistically significant. Hence, we argue that macroeconomic risk is a powerful determinant of cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.

This paper investigates hedge funds' exposures to various financial and macroeconomic risk factors through alternative measures of factor betas and examines their performance in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. Both parametric and non-parametric tests indicate a significantly positive (negative) link between default premium beta (inflation beta) and future hedge fund returns. The results are robust across different subsample periods and states of the economy, and after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors as well as the trend-following factors in stocks, short-term interest rates, currencies, bonds, and commodities. The paper also provides macro-level and micro-level explanations of our findings.

We explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Our sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk‐adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A probit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year‐by‐year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed, and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.

We explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Our sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A probit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year-by-year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed, and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.