We provide the first direct empirical evidence of the effect of CEO social capital on aggregate corporate risk-taking. Our theory predicts that CEOs with high social capital display higher levels of risk-seeking behavior. Consistent with this prediction, we find a positive association between CEO social capital and aggregate corporate risk-taking. Examining the channel, we show that social ties cause corporate policy actions, and these actions lead to greater volatilities in stock returns and earnings. In addition, we uncover a number of factors that significantly moderate the effects of social capital on risk-taking. We also show that this increase in risk-taking is value-enhancing to the firm. Our results are robust to alternative proxies for risk-taking, alternative model specifications, and tests for endogeneity.

This study examines how the appointment of former politicians and regulators to boards of directors or management teams influences corporate acquisition activity and performance. We find that bidders with political connections are more likely to acquire targets and avoid regulatory delay or denial. The merger premium paid increases with political connectedness. The announcement period returns show that investors recognize that bids by politically connected acquirers are more likely to create firm value. Connected bidders make more bids and bid on larger targets. Connected acquirers also enjoy superior post-merger financial and operating performance.

We examine a sample of companies that make announcements attributing blame for recent poor performance to either themselves or an external factor. We find that both groups of companies exhibit poor company-specific performance prior to the announcement, indicating that companies blaming external factors are not being truthful. Following the announcement, companies that blame themselves begin to perform better while those that blame others continue their weak performance. We find no differences in the financial and governance characteristics of these companies. Companies that blame themselves, however, provide more detailed information about the source of the problem, while those that blame others offer only vague generalizations. Our results suggest that managerial honesty and forthrightness have value to shareholders since they imply that the company is more likely to make the corrections necessary to achieve stronger future performance.

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.

Using a sample of U.S. firms over the period, 1984 to 2013, this study examines the relation between market and book leverage ratios. Unlike Welch (2004) who contends that changes in market leverage do not induce adjustments in book leverage, we find an asymmetric effect. That is, firms adjust their book leverage only when the changes in market leverage are due to increases in equity values. No adjustment is observed when firm equity values decrease. Our results are consistent with Myers (1977) and Barclay et al. (2006) who argue that optimal debt levels decrease with corporate growth opportunities.

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.

We test whether a bias exists in analyst recommendations for firms that file for bankruptcy during 1995–2001. We fail to find overoptimism in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts. Our multivariate analysis of the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations indicates that prior affiliation exerts no impact on either returns or trading volume. We find that the market does not view recommendation upgrades by affiliated analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following these recommendation changes. Overall, our results suggest that recently passed legislation to reduce analysts' conflicts of interest might be an overreaction.

We examine the effect of managerial social capital on the firm's cost of equity capital. We argue that social ties alleviate information asymmetry and agency problems, which in turn leads to a decrease in the cost of equity. Using a large panel of companies from 52 countries over the period 1999–2012, we document that social capital inversely affects the cost of equity. Our evidence suggests that the association between social capital and the cost of equity capital is stronger in underdeveloped financial markets and those characterized by weak legal protection. The marginal effect of social capital is also stronger for constrained firms with profitable investment opportunities. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and tests for endogeneity.

This paper presents empirical evidence comparing two models of trading in equities—the well‐known tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis and “the disposition effect.” According to the disposition effect, investors are reluctant to realize losses but are eager to realize gains. This paper distinguishes between the two models with a new methodology that examines the relationship between volume at a given point in time and volume that took place in the past at different stock prices. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the disposition effect not only as a determinant of year‐end volume, but also as a determinant of volume levels throughout the year.