We study the Markov equilibria of a model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and irreversible contributions to a durable public good. We show that the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero. For any level of depreciation, moreover, the highest steady state converges to the efficient level as agents become increasingly patient. These results are in contrast to the case with reversible investments, where a continuum of inefficient equilibrium steady states exists for any level of depreciation, discount factor, and size of population.

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections by Marco Battaglini, Rebecca B. Morton and Thomas R. Palfrey. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 194-200 of American Economic Review, May 2008

Through the use of laboratory market methodology, the effect of a futures market on the time path of asset prices is studied and competing models of asset pricing are analyzed. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of a rational expectations equilibrium model are relatively accurate whether or not futures markets are present. However, the presence of futures markets increases the speed with which an efficient equilibrium is achieved. While this more rapid adjustment can increase the variance of spot market prices as they move to equilibrium, this increased variance reflects efficiency gains due to better information.

Through the use of laboratory market methodology, the effect of a futures market on the time path of asset prices is studied and competing models of asset pricing are analyzed. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of rational expectations equilibrium model are relatively accurate whether or not futures markets are present. However, the presence of futures markets increases the speed with which an efficient equilibrium is achieved. While this more rapid adjustment can increase the variance of spot market prices as they move to equilibrium, this increased variance reflects efficiency gains due to better information.

This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multistage games. The approach uses behavioral strategies rather than normal form mixed strategies and imposes sequential rationality. We define and characterize properties of cursed sequential equilibrium (CSE) and apply it to four canonical economic applications: signaling games, reputation building, durable goods monopoly, and the dirty faces game. These applications illustrate various implications of CSE, show how and why it differs from sequential equilibrium and CE, and provide evidence from laboratory experiments that support the empirical relevance of CSE.

Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees by S. Nageeb Ali, Jacob K. Goeree, Navin Kartik and Thomas R. Palfrey. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 181-86 of American Economic Review, May 2008