Recent studies suggest that the underperformance of IPOs in the post-1970 sample may be a small sample effect or “Peso problem.” That is, IPO underperformance may result from observing too few star performers ex post than were expected ex ante. We develop a model of IPO performance that captures this intuition by allowing returns to be drawn from mixtures of outstanding, benchmark, or poor performing states. We estimate the model under the null of no ex ante average IPO underperformance and construct small sample distributions of various statistics measuring IPO relative performance. We find that small sample biases are extremely unlikely to account for the magnitude of the post-1970 IPO underperformance observed in data.

In certain circumstances, insider trades such as private transactions between executives and their firms could be disclosed after the end of the firm's fiscal year, on a Form-5 filing. We find that insider sales disclosed in such a delayed manner for large firms are predictive of negative future returns (−6 to −8 percent), as well as lower future annual earnings relative to analyst forecasts. These results stand in contrast to existing findings on the uninformativeness of quickly disclosed open-market insider sales. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act curtailed the use of Form 5 under the presumption that managers used this vehicle opportunistically. Our systematic evidence supports this presumption.

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm's‐length, spot market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational structure in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. We find that better‐networked VC firms experience significantly better fund performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited through an IPO or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better‐networked VCs are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and eventual exit. We also provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.

The price of defaultable or credit-risky bonds differs from the equivalent maturity price of a risk-free bond for a well identified number of factors: the positive probability of default prior to the bond maturity, the estimated loss given default, that depends on the adopted assumption on the recovery rate for that class, see Duffie and Singleton [Duffie, D., Singleton, K.J., 1999. Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds. Rev. Financ. Stud. 12, 687–720] for several models of recovery rates, the probability that the bond issuer will migrate from the current rating class to a lower class. In this study we apply two well-known modelling approaches, due to Jarrow et al. [Jarrow, R.A., Lando, D., Turnbull, S.M., 1997. A Markov model for the term structure of credit risk spreads. Rev. Financ. Stud. 10, 481–523] and Schönbucher [Schönbucher, P.J., 2002. A tree implementation of a credit spread model for credit. J. Comput. Finance 6 (2), 175–196] to price specifically two risk sources affecting the evolution of bond prices over time: the risk to move from a current risk class to a different one over the bond residual life, and the risk associated with comovements of the credit spread curves and the risk-free term structure. The former is referred to as transition risk, the latter as correlation risk. The analysis is conducted extending appropriately to a multinomial setting the classical discrete binomial model of the term structure formulated by Black et al. [Black, F., Derman, E., Toy, W., 1990. A one-factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options. Financ. Analysts J. (January/February), 33–39], applied previously by Abaffy et al. [Abaffy, J., Bertocchi, M., Dupačová, J., Moriggia, V., 2000. On generating scenarios for bond portfolios. Bull. Czech Econom. Soc. 11, 3–27, and references ibidem] and many other authors in literature. The generalised model, with transition [by Jarrow et al.] and correlation risk [by Schönbucher], is applied to a large dataset of corporate spreads to evaluate the sensitivity of the isolated risk sources on the fair price of risky bonds traded in the Eurobond market.

Using industry-level data disaggregated by states, this paper finds a positive impact of trade liberalization on (the absolute values of) labor demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector. The magnitudes of these elasticities turn out to be negatively related to protection levels that vary across industries and over time. Furthermore, we find that these elasticities are not only larger in size for Indian states with more flexible labor regulations, they are also impacted there to a larger degree by trade reforms. Finally, we find that the reforms have led to a reduction in the share of labor in total output and value added, possibly due to the reduction in the bargaining power of workers.

This paper presents the results of two experiments conducted in Mumbai and Vadodara, India, designed to evaluate ways to improve the quality of education in urban slums. The authors argue that resources alone may not be sufficient to improve educational outcomes. The authors study the impact of a remedial education programme which hired young women from the community to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills to children lagging behind in government schools. A computer-assisted learning programme also provided each child in the fourth grade with two hours of shared computer time per week, in which students played educational games that reinforced mathematics skills.

The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share‐one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher‐spread and worse‐performing firms, especially when voting is close. Vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.

This study extends current literature related to nonaudit services by investigating internal audit outsourcing to the external auditor. We posit that certain types of internal audit outsourcing (i.e., those which are nonroutine, and thus tend to be nonrecurring in nature) are unlikely to lead to economic bonding, while offering significant potential for improvements in audit coverage and scope when provided by the external auditor. Alternatively, outsourcing routine internal audit tasks is more likely to lead to economic bonding, as well as potentially threatening internal auditor independence. Our results are consistent with firms with independent, active, and expert audit committees being less likely to outsource routine internal auditing activities to the external auditor. However, the outsourcing of nonroutine internal audit activities such as special projects and EDP consulting are not negatively related to effective audit committees. Additionally, outsourcing of either type of internal audit activity to an outside service provider other than the external auditor is not related to effective audit committees. Collectively, we interpret these findings as supportive of an effective audit committee's ability to monitor the sourcing of the firm's total (i.e., internal and external) audit coverage, while simultaneously exhibiting concern for external auditor independence.