We formulate and analyze a model of team structure and monitoring within a Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) agency framework. We incorporate three key instruments in the internal design of an organization involving team production: team size, monitoring activities, and incentive contracts. We show that the complex tradeoffs among these instruments lead to surprisingly simple implications. One such result is that the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance for workers is attenuated and is, at times, invariant to most environmental variables of interest. As such, our model helps explain the empirical puzzle of the lack of a trade-off for risk/incentives shown in standard agency models. Our work also demonstrates the presence of complementarities between team size and monitoring, and between worker talent and managerial monitoring ability. Finally, we derive predictions about the impact of environmental variables on the choice of optimal team size, incentives, and employee quality, even in the presence of an external marketplace for talent.

Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle by Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan and Marian V. Wrobel. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 304-09 of American Economic Review, May 2008

In this paper we develop two nonparametric tests of treatment effect heterogeneity. The first test is for the null hypothesis that the treatment has a zero average effect for all subpopulations defined by covariates. The second test is for the null hypothesis that the average effect conditional on the covariates is identical for all subpopulations, that is, that there is no heterogeneity in average treatment effects by covariates. We derive tests that are straightforward to implement and illustrate the use of these tests on data from two sets of experimental evaluations of the effects of welfare-to-work programs.

We focus on public‐market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision‐making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.