Critics argue that shelf registration greatly reduces the ability of underwriters to perform adequate due diligence. This argument suggests underwriters will demand greater compensation for shelf issues compared to such traditional issues as an insurance premium for protection against potential litigation or loss of reputation caused by inadequate due diligence. Our findings suggest the presence of such a premium, that the premium is higher for firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities, and that underwriters perceive that shelf registration erodes due diligence and, subsequently, price the due diligence erosion accordingly. This pricing behavior is consistent with our findings that firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities are more likely to choose traditional registration.

This paper compares real and monetary business cycle models with and without endogenous technical change. If technology is endogenous, the properties of these models change significantly. In particular, both real and monetary models yield very similar output processes if growth is endogenous, and changes in aggregate demand can result in permanent changes in productivity, employment, and output. The effect of depreciation of technology is examined, and the pattern of real wage movements over the cycle when money wages are fixed, but technology is changing, is briefly considered. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

This paper compares real and monetary business cycle models with and without endogenous technical change. If technology is endogenous, is endogenous, the properties of these models change significantly. In particular, both real and monetary models yield very similar output processes if growth is endogenous, and changes in aggregate demand can result in permanent changes in productivity, employment, and output. The effect of depreciation of technology is examined, and the pattern of real wage movements over the cycle when money wages are fixed but technology is changing is briefly considered.

Abstract. This paper presents the results of an experiment that examined five hypotheses related to the information search and evidence evaluation that takes place as part of an auditor's sequential decision process. The results indicate the following. (1) When given a choice, auditors examined the most reliable type of evidence. (2) Auditors who stopped at intermediate stages in the sequential task had, on average, more extreme assessments of the outcome, although there were differential effects depending on whether the auditors based their decisions on positive or negative evidence. (3) Changes in the direction of the auditor's judgments were consistent with the signal in the audit evidence. (4) Negative evidence, in general, led to greater judgment revisions than positive evidence, and the most reliable negative evidence led to the greatest revisions. (5) Auditors searched for corroborating evidence, but their evaluation of that evidence did not impact the assessment of evidence received earlier in the sequential task. Résumé. Les auteurs présentent les résultats d'une expérience portant sur l'analyse de cinq hypothèses reliées à la recherche d'information et à l'évaluation de l'information probante qui s'inscrivent dans le processus de décision séquentiel du vérificateur. Les résultats obtenus indiquent ce qui suit: 1) lorsqu'ils ont le choix, les vérificateurs examinent l'information probante la plus fiable, 2) les vérificateurs qui s'arrêtent à des étapes intermédiaires de la tâche séquentielle produisent, en moyenne, des évaluations plus extrêmes des résultats, bien que l'on observe des incidences marginales selon que les vérificateurs ont fondé leurs décisions sur des informations probantes expresses ou tacites, 3) les modifications dans l'orientation des jugements posés par le verificateur sont conformes aux indications livrées par l'information probante, 4) l'information probante tacite mène, en général, à une révision plus importante des jugements que l'information expresse, et l'information tacite la plus fiable mène à la révision la plus approfondie, et 5) les vérificateurs cherchent à obtenir des preuves de corroboration mais leur évaluation de cette information probante n'a pas d'incidence sur lévaluation de l'information probante obtenue aux étapes antérieures de la tâche séquentielle.

In this paper, the authors reexamine the data from B. O'Neill's (1987) experiment involving a repeated, two-person, constant-sum game. They find that there is less evidence in support of the minimax hypothesis than indicated by O'Neill. There is strong evidence of serial correlation in players' choices, with several players displaying statistically significant dependence on the past moves of their opponents. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that the plays themselves rejected minimax play as the appropriate model for their opponents' behavior. They find no evidence that players' behavior approached minimax behavior as players became more experienced. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

Henry W. Herzog, Jr., Alan M. Schlottmann, Valuing Risk in the Workplace: Market Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provision of Safety, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 463-470

In a dual-currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.