[We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2), justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.]

We study the implied volatility behavior of call options around scheduled news announcement days. Implied volatilities increase significantly during the pre-event period and reach a maximum on the eve of the news announcement. After the news release, implied volatility drops sharply and gradually moves back to its long-run level. Only on the event date are movements in the price of the underlying significantly larger than expected. These results confirm the theoretical results of Merton (1973).

Abstract Reviews the book `Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting,' by G. Jack Bologna and Robert J. Lindquist.

We examine in this paper a new natural restriction on utility functions, namely that adding an unfair background risk to wealth makes risk-averse individuals behave in a more risk-averse way with respect to any other independent risk. This concept is called risk vulnerability. It is equivalent to the condition that an undesirable risk can never be made desirable by the presence of an independent, unfair risk. Moreover, under risk vulnerability, adding an unfair background risk reduces the demand for risky assets. Risk vulnerability generalizes the concept of properness (individually undesirable, independent risks are always jointly undesirable) introduced by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987). It implies that the two first derivatives of the utility function are concave transformations of the original utility function. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, a sufficient condition for risk vulnerability is local properness, i.e. r'' ≥ r'r, where r is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

We examine the evidence on whether real wages decline with age among older men. While the general human capital model of wage growth over the life cycle predicts that wages will fall as workers approach the end of their career, alternative models of wage growth do not predict these wage declines. We find that in longitudinal estimates of age-wage profiles wage declines only set in for workers in their 60s. Furthermore, these longitudinal declines are at least partly due to interactions with the Social Security system. The earnings cap or other effects of Social Security appear to lead some workers to choose jobs and job characteristics associated with lower wages. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

This article studies the design and valuation of debt contracts in a general dynamic setting under uncertainty. We incorporate some insights of the recent corporate finance literature into a valuation framework. The basic framework is an extensive form game determined by the terms of a debt contract and applicable bankruptcy laws. Debtholders and equityholders behave noncooperatively. The firm’s reorganization boundary is determined endogenously. Strategic debt service results in significantly higher default premia at even small liquidation costs. Deviations from absolute priority and forced liquidations occur along the equilibrium path. The design tends to stress higher coupons and sinking funds when firms have a higher cash payout ratio.