Stanley Engerman has been a presence in the Department of Economics at the University of Rochester for over 37 years. He was an early and eminent participant in the Cliometric Revolution that swept throughout the economichistory profession in the 1960’s and 1970’s. We doubt that anyone could have anticipated the “gathering storm” that greeted the publication of Time on the Cross, co-authored with Robert Fogel in 1974. Since that time Stan has become the world’s leading authority on slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean, as well as an important contributor to a set of issues ranging from the 19th century American iron industry to the economics of British imperialism. His own human capital, as extensive as we know it to be, is complemented by capital of the physical variety: an enormous library of research material spilling over into bookshelves and floors in several offices in Rochester and attracting a yearly stream of itinerant scholars anxious to pick his books as well as his brains. In this short note, we intend to honor Stan by applying the tools of international trade theory to illustrate several episodes in the development of industries, both in the United States and in world markets. A colleague of Stan’s at Rochester, Lionel McKenzie, once commented that, in 19th century Britain, Lancashire would have been unlikely to produce cotton cloth if the cotton had to be grown in England (McKenzie, 1954). This remark expresses in utter brevity the importance to production and trading patterns of the domain of tradability of raw materials or intermediate products. For example, it is difficult to envisage the patterns of production (and trade) in modern-day Japan should it be denied access to world supplies of oil, coal, and iron ore, local production of each of these items being negligible. Transport costs as well as man-made impediments to trade are mainly responsible for variations in the degree of access countries possess to the inputs available in the markets of other countries. Simple competitive generalequilibrium models of production, of the type intensively utilized in the theory of international trade, can usefully be harnessed to shed light on several episodes in 19th century American economic history in which the nature of trading possibilities for raw materials heavily influenced the extent to which local American production of final commodities could withstand the pressures in world markets without the aid of protective devices. The simplest model setting in which to investigate the importance of trade in raw materials is a Ricardian model, augmented by the necessity of using a produced input in addition to labor in at least one commodity. Denote the pair of final commodities by X and Y, where in order to produce Y a certain quantity of intermediate good, Z, is required. The competitive profit conditions for the two final commodities are shown in equation (1):

We investigate the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO's annual bonus. After controlling for the general pay-for-performance relation, we find a significant incremental adverse effect on CEO annual cash bonuses when the firm's quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst forecast or the earnings for the same quarter of the prior year, for at least two quarters during the year. However, we find that the relation between the bonus and the number of loss quarters is not significant. Our results suggest that CEO bonus payments provide CEOs with economic incentives to meet quarterly analyst earnings forecasts and earnings from the same quarter of the prior year.

Critics argue that the estate tax prevents the owners of family businesses from passing their enterprises to heirs because it is difficult to pay estate taxes without liquidating the business. Why don't owners purchase enough life insurance to meet their estate tax liabilities? We examine whether and how people use life insurance to deal with the estate tax. We find that, ceteris paribus, business owners purchase more life insurance than do other individuals. However, on the margin, their insurance purchases are less responsive to estate tax considerations, and they are less likely to have the wherewithal to meet estate tax liabilities out of liquid assets plus insurance.

In this article we ask: what kind of information and how much of it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosures are considered. One is information that complements the information available only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementary information). The second is information that is orthogonal to that which any investor can acquire and thus complements the information available to all investors (preprocessed complementary information). And the third is information that substitutes for the information of the informed investors in that it reveals to all what was previously known only by the informed (substitute information). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium, all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information. Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementary information disclosure by firms strengthens investors’ private incentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosure weakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, while complementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effect on financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosure weakens those incentives.

We study asset allocation when the conditional moments of returns are partly predictable. Rather than first model the return distribution and subsequently characterize the portfolio choice, we determine directly the dependence of the optimal portfolio weights on the predictive variables. We combine the predictors into a single index that best captures time variations in investment opportunities. This index helps investors determine which economic variables they should track and, more importantly, in what combination. We consider investors with both expected utility (mean variance and CRRA) and nonexpected utility (ambiguity aversion and prospect theory) objectives and characterize their market timing, horizon effects, and hedging demands.

The resurgence of the American economy since 1995 has outrun all but the most optimistic expectations. Economic forecasting models have been seriously off track and growth projections have been revised to reflect a more sanguine outlook only recently. It is not surprising that the unusual combination of more rapid growth and slower inflation in the 1990's has touched off a strenuous debate among economists about whether improvements in America's economic performance can be sustained. The starting point for the economic debate is the thesis that the 1990's are a mirror image of the 1970's, when an unfavorable series of supply shocks led to stagflation -- slower growth and higher inflation. In this view, the development of information technology (IT) is one of a series of positive, but temporary, shocks. The competing perspective is that IT has produced a fundamental change in the U.S. economy, leading to a permanent improvement in growth prospects.

There is abundant evidence that the production process of firms is becoming increasingly fragmented internationally, in the sense that a final manufactured good will consist of parts that have been manufactured in a variety of different countries. Studies of manufacturing industries suggest that the share of imported inputs in international trade rose significantly in the 1970's and 1980's, and that the fragmentation of the production process has been particularly pronounced in industries such as transportation equipment and electrical machinery.1 What difference does it make if trade reflects a fragmentation of the production process, rather than the traditional horizontal specialization in final goods? In this paper I focus on the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of commercial policy and emphasize two features of vertical relationships.2 The first is the market linkages that are introduced in models of fragmentation due to the interaction between tariffs on final goods and tariffs on intermediate goods. The incentives of countries regarding tariff reduction can vary significantly depending on the pattern of trade. The second feature of vertical specialization is that producers of final goods often require inputs that are specialized to their particular needs, so that vertical relationships may create contracting problems because of the possibility for opportunistic behavior. Commercial policy may play a role in altering the form of these vertical relationships.

Using a large data set, the authors find that smokers select riskier jobs, but receive lower total wage compensation for risk than do nonsmokers. This finding is inconsistent with conventional models of compensating differentials. The authors develop a model in which worker risk preferences and job safety performance lead to smokers facing a flatter market offer curve than nonsmokers. The empirical results support the theoretical model. Smokers are injured more often controlling for their job's objective risk and are paid less for these risks of injury. Smokers and nonsmokers, in effect, are segmented labor market groups with different preferences and different market offer curves. © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

If the market anticipates the reversing nature of abnormal working capital accruals, then the reported magnitude of earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals will differ from the underlying magnitude that is priced by the market. We expect the market's perception of this difference to affect the ERCs associated with earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals. We test our predictions using an abnormal accruals measure that captures the difference between reported working capital and a proxy for the market's expectations of the level of working capital required to support current sales levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find higher ERCs when abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprises. We also find results consistent with analysts predictably considering the reversing implications of abnormal accruals in revising future earnings forecasts. These findings are consistent with market participants anticipating the reversing implications of abnormal accruals. However, analysis of subsequent stock returns provides evidence that market participants do not fully impound the pricing implications of abnormal accruals at the earnings announcement date.

Much of what has been written about the process of economic development has concentrated on macroeconomic factors that affect the growth process, such as the community’s savings rate, its ability to attract foreign investment, and the composition and quality of its factor-endowment base. Less formally dealt with, but nonetheless often cited as important in the development process, is the nature of government regulations and the type of institutions that are reflective of the community’s own cultural inheritance…