Abstract This paper investigates the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. Our tests examine two key aspects of market liquidity, the effective bid‐ask spread and quoted depth, and how they relate to financial analysts' ratings of firms' disclosure policies. We introduce a method of combining order sizes and depth quotes to yield more precise estimates of effective spreads on trades likely constrained by quoted depth. We find that while firms with higher rated disclosures are charged lower effective spreads, they are also quoted lower depth, consistent with the notion that better disclosures reduce information asymmetry but also cause some liquidity suppliers to exit the market. Therefore, a simple examination of spreads and depths yields ambiguous inferences on the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. We resolve this ambiguity by estimating depth‐adjusted effective spreads, and find that firms with higher rated disclosures have lower depth‐adjusted effective spreads across all trade sizes. Consequently, our results reveal a robust inverse relation between disclosure ratings and effective trading costs. This implies that a policy of enhanced financial disclosure is related to improved market liquidity.

We study how heterogeneous beliefs affect returns and examine whether they are a priced factor in traditional asset pricing models. To accomplish this task, we suggest new empirical measures based on the disagreement among analysts about expected earnings (short-term and long-term) and show they are good proxies. We first establish that the heterogeneity of beliefs matters for asset pricing and then turn our attention to estimating a structural model in which we use the forecasts of financial analysts to proxy for agents’ beliefs. Finally, we investigate whether the amount of heterogeneity in analysts’ forecasts can help explain asset pricing puzzles.

Abstract This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third‐party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental‐markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo‐Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.

Abstract We show that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of raising external capital. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings, we find that, ceteris paribus, investment banks' fees are significantly lower for firms with more liquid stock. We estimate that the difference in the investment banking fee for firms in the most liquid vs. the least liquid quintile is about 101 basis points or 21% of the average investment banking fee in our sample. Our findings suggest that firms can reduce the cost of raising capital by improving the market liquidity of their stock.

We present a simulation-based method for solving discrete-time portfolio choice problems involving non-standard preferences, a large number of assets with arbitrary return distribution, and, most importantly, a large number of state variables with potentially path-dependent or non-stationary dynamics. The method is flexible enough to accommodate intermediate consumption, portfolio constraints, parameter and model uncertainty, and learning. We first establish the properties of the method for the portfolio choice between a stock index and cash when the stock returns are either iid or predictable by the dividend yield. We then explore the problem of an investor who takes into account the predictability of returns but is uncertain about the parameters of the data generating process. The investor chooses the portfolio anticipating that future data realizations will contain useful information to learn about the true parameter values. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

State "Currencies" and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar: Reply-Including a New View from Canada by Farley W. Grubb. Published in volume 95, issue 4, pages 1341-1348 of American Economic Review, September 2005

This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios. Under our central parameter values, and with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $0.95/gal for the US and $1.29/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative plausible parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due almost entirely to a higher assumed value for marginal congestion cost. Revenue-raising needs, incorporated in a “Ramsey" component, also play a significant role, as do accident externalities and local air pollution. However, we also find that a shift in taxation off gasoline and onto vehicle miles can produce much larger welfare gains than those from implementing second-best optimal gasoline taxes.

Because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than outsiders can learn from her realized returns, she expects inefficiency in future contracts that condition exclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns what the manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough. The family's incentive is to retain any given manager regardless of her skill but, when the family has enough managers, it adds value by boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others. As the number of managers grows, the efficiency loss goes to zero. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

ABSTRACT This study examines the allocation of cash proceeds following 400 subsidiary sales between 1990 and 1998. Retention probabilities are increasing in the divesting firm's contemporaneous growth opportunities and expected investment. Retaining firms, however, also systematically overinvest relative to an industry benchmark. Shareholder returns to retention decisions are positively correlated with growth opportunities and benchmarked investment, but negatively correlated with benchmarked investment for firms with poor growth opportunities. Shareholder returns to debt distributions are increasing in industry‐benchmarked leverage. Overall, the results of this study cohere with the hypothesized trade‐off between the investment efficiencies associated with retained proceeds and the agency costs of managerial discretion and debt.