This paper analyzes the SEC's proxy regulations and assesses their effects on corporate governance. The proxy rules began in 1935 as a minimal series of disclosure requirements and a prohibition against fraud. By 1956, they imposed extensive and wide-ranging disclosure requirements on anyone wishing to communicate about voting issues and required that all such communications be cleared in advance — in essence, censored — by the SEC. I present evidence that since that time, the rules have significantly increased the costs of communication and coordinated action among shareholders. They have thus deterred shareholder initiatives and inhibited the development of a private market for information about voting issues

When changes in the economic policy regime occur stochastically, asset prices will reflect the possibility of such shifts. In this paper we apply techniques of regulated Brownian motion to obtain closed-form analytic price solutions when policy reaction functions are subject to prospective changes. We focus on the case in which the authorities promise to peg a currency's exchange rate once it reaches a predetermined future level. We also show how an open-ended commitment to exchange-rate targeting may lead to multiple equilibria

This study estimates translog variable cost functions for 147 American doctorate granting universities, accounting for three major products of these institutions: undergraduate and graduate instruction, and research. Explicit measures of research output and quality are employed. Evidence is found for considerable economies of scale for the average institution, as well as economies of scope related to the joint production of undergraduate and graduate instruction. The public or private ownership of an institution is not significant for the explanation of variable costs. The intensity of state regulation in the public sector does not have a significant impact on production efficiency

For generations government regulations and business traditions confined financial activities within national borders. Leaders and borrowers maintained relationships with domestic bankers, who offered little in the way of innovation or advantage. But the abolition of fixed exchange rates, along with hyper-inflation in the 1970s spelled the beginning of the end for this system. By the 1980s the financial game in the UK, Japan and USA was being played ith some important new rules, and by many new players. The old world of relationship banking had given way to financial transactions based upon price and product innovation. Macroeconomic forces and the policies of central bankers have profoundly altered international trade, exchange rates, and the flow of capital around the world. David Meerschwam explains these economic forces, describes the dramatic effects of de-regulation in the major centres of finance, and shows how financial services firms have had to alter their strategies and develop new skills in order to compete

This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off‐peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est‐à‐dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe

Recently developed effort regulation models argue that labor markets are segmented because of differences in the technology of supervision across firms. primary jobs pay above market clearing wages because these jobs are difficult to monitor. Secondary jobs, in contrast, pose no monitoring difficulties and therefore pay a market clearing wage. If, as the literature suggests, increases in employer size make supervision more difficult, we should observe that wages increase with employer size in primary jobs but not in secondary jobs. We test this hypothesis using a switching regression model. We find evidence of an employer size wage effect in both primary and secondary labor markets. However, consistent with the prediction of effort control models, the size effect on wages is considerably larger in primary than secondary jobs

We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive

[The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and its affiliated state societies promote restrictive accountancy laws that limit both the right to express opinions on financial statements and the use of certain occupational titles to licensed public accountants. Although occupational licensing, like other forms of government regulation, is justified as being in the "public interest," critics (e.g., Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976) suggest that licensing arises because of the professional groups' interest in using the coercive power of government for their own economic advantage. Until 1979, CPAs were content to limit state regulation to the audit function, permitting unlicensed accountants to perform other accounting tasks. With the growing importance of review and compilation services, however, CPAs have sought to restrict the performance of these services too. In addition, the AICPA and state CPA societies have used their influence with state legislatures and licensing boards to impose limitations on the use of professional titles such as "public accountant," "accountant," and "auditor." Whereas some states have adopted relatively permissive licensing laws, others restrict all analytical work and professional titles to licensees. This study explains why some states have adopted more restrictive licensing regimes than others. Hypotheses are developed to test the power of interest groups, political systems, and socioeconomic variables in explaining such differences. The evidence, based on both univariate and multivariate techniques, supports the following general conclusions. Restrictive licensing regimes are more likely in states where the interest-group strength of CPAs is high, as measured by their numbers relative to public accountants who are not CPAs. Restrictiveness is inversely related to statewide competition between Republicans and Democrats and is slightly related to legislative turnover