Treasury Regulations typically require a firm to use its manufacturing cost as one input in calculating the transfer price to be used for tax purposes. Because the characteristics of the firm's capital assets determine the realized manufacturing cost, the firm has an incentive to distort its investment choices in order to receive a more favorable tax transfer price. This represents an ex ante form of shifting income across divisions. Practical difficulties in enforcing the regulations provide the firm with another way to shift income. In particular, regulators often can identify only a range of acceptable transfer prices. As a result, the firm will not use the true “arm's length” transfer price, but will instead choose a transfer price that is more favorable for tax purposes. I find that the opportunity to shift income ex post in this manner may reduce the value of investment-based ex ante income shifting. That is, if the firm has more discretion over the ex post transfer price, then it may invest more efficiently ex ante. Although it is commonly perceived that ex post income shifting is purely deleterious, the analysis shows that it may have benefits

In order to shed some light on the desirability of hedge disclosures, I investigate the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm’s risk management strategy. Several major results emerge from this analysis. First, greater transparency about a firm’s derivative activities is not necessarily a panacea for imprudent risk management strategies. I show that such transparency actually induces the firm to take excessive speculative positions in the derivative market. Second, I show that the firm may choose a prudent risk management strategy in the absence of hedge disclosures. However, the selection of a prudent risk management comes at a cost. The firm’s production policy is distorted in the absence of hedge disclosures. These findings suggest that regulators must carefully investigate the trade‐offs between production distortions and risk management distortions in evaluating the desirability of mandatory hedge disclosures for all firms

Markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian. Using a model of off- and on-the-job search and event-history, individual-level data for Italy and the U.S., we show that while the cross-sectional wage distributions of young Italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white U.S. males, the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the U.S. than it is in Italy. Our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of "long run" welfare in the U.S. and a high level of cross-sectional inequality

The use of incentive regulation and other alternative regulatory programs in U.S. electricity markets has grown during the past two decades. Within a stochastic frontier framework, I investigate the effect of individual programs on the technical efficiency of a large set of coal and natural gas generation units. I find that those programs tied directly to generator performance and those that modify traditional fuel cost pass-through programs, to provide a greater incentive to reduce fuel costs, are associated with greater efficiency levels. Other programs have no statistical association with efficiency levels

Evidence suggests that municipal water utility administrators in the western US price water significantly below its marginal cost and, in so doing, inefficiently exploit aquifer stocks and induce social surplus losses. This paper empirically identifies the objective function of those managers, measures the deadweight losses resulting from their price-discounting decisions, and recovers the efficient water pricing policy function from counterfactual experiments. In doing so, the estimation uses a “continuous-but-constrained- control” version of a nested fixed-point algorithm in order to measure the important intertemporal consequences of groundwater pricing decisions.

The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 limited thrift goodwill that could be counted as regulatory capital. This paper infers the significance of the thrift put option value from the relationship between thrift goodwill and stock returns. The ability to count goodwill as regulatory capital might have resulted in large put option values by allowing many thrifts to hold low capital and risky assets before the legislation. Tightened regulation may have reduced put option values and hence the wealth of thrift shareholders. Goodwill had a large negative effect on stock returns of low capital thrifts in 1989 and the negative effect persisted in the following two years. These findings suggest that many thrifts had large put option values before the FIRREA and the elimination of put option values was largely responsible for the stock price decline

The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation

The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the "fulcrum" and the "incentive" types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers

The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the “fulcrum” and the “incentive” types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers

There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented